Page 52 - CULTURE IN THE COMMUNICATION AGE

RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONS OF CULTURE

of capture. The predator then anticipates analogically what is moving in the
environment (Thom 1983: 273). We can imagine how the process goes,
through a flickering of analogical anticipations. The predator identifies with
the prey, loses its analogical bond, for the prey is trying to flee, and concentrates
on recapturing through forecasting what the prey would do next. On the other
hand, apart from pure and simple flight, the prey is left with two equally
analogical alternatives: it can display mimicry and camouflage to deceive the
predator or associate itself with other individuals of the species. Analogy is the
most fundamental mechanism in biological life; it is the underlining quality of
moving predatory interactors as well as the relatively stable environmental
scenario where predator and prey get in contact with each other. In any cir-
cumstance, both for living organisms and for the environment, analogy
drives the natural world.

Predatory interaction and group formation in the natural world
The most obvious mechanisms of defense in predatory interaction are
mimetism and camouflage, either through blending with the environment, or
else by feigning ferocity. Owen (1982) mentions the case of the frog Physalaemus
netteri that displays on its back the outline of big, bulging eyes; this allows the
frog to point its behind in the direction of the predator, forcing the retreat, or
the abandonment of the predatory chase. Another complementary example is
the butterfly Limentis archippus that mimetically looks not like a predator but a
specific kind of prey, Danaus plexippus, whose taste is awful to its predators. 7
Besides strict mimetism, there is another option: the prey can associate with
analogous individuals of its species with the purpose of protecting itself from
predators. We will see that this is the propitious situation for the evolution of
social behavior too.
It is naive to presume that conventions precede individuals who are then
forced to adapt to the rules of the group. In nature, uniformity is not a given: it
is unstable and subject to change. If the most fundamental fact of biological life
is individual genetic singularity, the formation of a group is always precarious,
thus quite different from the ideal stability that anthropological functionalism
used to postulate. All across the natural world, and this includes human cultures,
the whole is a relationship made from the individual positions of the interactors;
it does not simply follow a prior collective mold.
Undoubtedly, the natural world is perfused with groups. It could not be
otherwise: natural life is centered on the transference and the replication of
genes within a population; and genetic replication is in itself somewhat a
product of co-operation between individual organisms (Trivers 1985: 65). If we
look, though, at the gathering of individuals in natural surroundings, we can
recognize constant and uniform movements, as if it were the orchestration of a
force stronger than any of its parts. Could the regular formation of a school
of fish, for example, provide evidence for the claim that a collective mold

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