Page 285 - Encyclopedia Of Terrorism
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           264———Nuclear Terrorism


           two people. Such weapons would obviously be very   where guards are now usually provided by private
           attractive to terrorists and were presumably tightly  security services.
           guarded. Several years ago, a Russian general testified  In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks
           to the U.S. House of Representatives that about 40 of  on the United States, authorities recognize the need to
           these weapons could not be accounted for in the    pay more attention to the possibility of terrorist suicide
           Russian inventory. His claim was denied by Russian  attacks on nuclear plants using aircraft. Most nuclear
           authorities, but the lack of international access to infor-  reactors are shielded by containment vessels (the dome
           mation about the Russian nuclear stockpile leaves ana-  often seen at a nuclear plant).  These reinforced
           lysts uneasy about the prospects that such weapons  concrete domes are several feet thick and designed to
           might have been procured by terrorists. One can only  contain an internal explosion so that radioactive debris
           conclude that as long as nuclear weapons exist in  does not escape into the atmosphere. Domes have been
           national stockpiles, there is a small probability that ter-  tested against the impact of light aircraft but no tests
           rorists could somehow obtain one as a result of a secu-  have ever been conducted with heavy aircraft like
           rity system failure.                               the ones used to attack the  World  Trade Center in
                                                              New York. Many experts doubt that the typical con-
                                                              tainment vessel would be able to withstand such an
           ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR REACTORS
                                                              impact.  There are still questions about what would
           While terrorists might find it difficult to make a  happen if an aircraft did penetrate the dome. It is not
           nuclear weapon even if they could obtain the neces-  known whether a penetration would result in the
           sary uranium or plutonium, and would face even more  release of nuclear material from the reactor core, or
           difficulty if they tried to obtain a complete weapon,  the magnitude of the release. Such questions require
           there are other forms of attack that are well within  extensive computer modeling using probabilistic risk
           their means. The large number of nuclear power reac-  assessment techniques to model the attack and make
           tors in the United States, Europe, and Asia presents  estimates of resulting damage.
           terrorists with an array of attractive targets. An attack  Other attack scenarios at nuclear plants involve
           on one of these reactors that succeeded in releasing  strikes against storage sites for spent nuclear fuel.
           large quantities of radioactive materials would    Spent fuel is highly radioactive and its release would
           threaten the downwind populations as well as those in  pose a serious threat to surrounding populations.
           the immediate vicinity.  The Chernobyl accident in  Spent-fuel sites are usually not as heavily protected as
           Ukraine is a case in point. An accident there released  reactor cores and are perceived to be more vulnerable.
           vast quantities of radioactive nuclear materials and  Experts are trying to address this problem, which may
           forced the permanent evacuation and abandonment of  eventually be solved by creating a national storage site
           a large swath of land in the vicinity. Radioactive fall-  in a secure locations that would accept spent fuel from
           out from the accident was detected throughout Europe  reactor facilities.
           in regions where wind carried the particulate matter  Nations are responding to terrorist threats against
           released in the plant explosion.                   reactors by trying to model various attack scenarios and
             Terrorists might try to attack reactors in several  devise appropriate responses. France was reported to
           ways. An armed group might try to force its way into  have placed surface-to-air antiaircraft missile batteries
           the plant to take over the system and damage it inten-  near some of its most sensitive nuclear facilities to
           tionally to cause a release of materials. Since the  guard against the possibility of suicide air attack. The
           instrumentation systems that control such plants are  United States has established “no-fly zones” over reac-
           complex, such an effort would require considerable  tors, but it is not clear how effective such zones would
           knowledge of nuclear engineering and plant design  be in the absence of round-the-clock combat air patrol
           to succeed. The terrorists would also have to over-  or the installation of antiaircraft missile batteries.
           come intrinsic safeguards built into the system to
           prevent accidents. Most nuclear plants have taken  ATTACKS WITH IMPROVISED
           steps to upgrade physical security systems to mini-  RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
           mize the probability that attackers could penetrate
           them. Some legislators want federal security guards  A radiological weapon is an improvised device
           at all reactor sites and nuclear weapon laboratories  designed to spread radioactive nuclear material over a
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