Page 285 - Encyclopedia Of Terrorism
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264———Nuclear Terrorism
two people. Such weapons would obviously be very where guards are now usually provided by private
attractive to terrorists and were presumably tightly security services.
guarded. Several years ago, a Russian general testified In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks
to the U.S. House of Representatives that about 40 of on the United States, authorities recognize the need to
these weapons could not be accounted for in the pay more attention to the possibility of terrorist suicide
Russian inventory. His claim was denied by Russian attacks on nuclear plants using aircraft. Most nuclear
authorities, but the lack of international access to infor- reactors are shielded by containment vessels (the dome
mation about the Russian nuclear stockpile leaves ana- often seen at a nuclear plant). These reinforced
lysts uneasy about the prospects that such weapons concrete domes are several feet thick and designed to
might have been procured by terrorists. One can only contain an internal explosion so that radioactive debris
conclude that as long as nuclear weapons exist in does not escape into the atmosphere. Domes have been
national stockpiles, there is a small probability that ter- tested against the impact of light aircraft but no tests
rorists could somehow obtain one as a result of a secu- have ever been conducted with heavy aircraft like
rity system failure. the ones used to attack the World Trade Center in
New York. Many experts doubt that the typical con-
tainment vessel would be able to withstand such an
ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR REACTORS
impact. There are still questions about what would
While terrorists might find it difficult to make a happen if an aircraft did penetrate the dome. It is not
nuclear weapon even if they could obtain the neces- known whether a penetration would result in the
sary uranium or plutonium, and would face even more release of nuclear material from the reactor core, or
difficulty if they tried to obtain a complete weapon, the magnitude of the release. Such questions require
there are other forms of attack that are well within extensive computer modeling using probabilistic risk
their means. The large number of nuclear power reac- assessment techniques to model the attack and make
tors in the United States, Europe, and Asia presents estimates of resulting damage.
terrorists with an array of attractive targets. An attack Other attack scenarios at nuclear plants involve
on one of these reactors that succeeded in releasing strikes against storage sites for spent nuclear fuel.
large quantities of radioactive materials would Spent fuel is highly radioactive and its release would
threaten the downwind populations as well as those in pose a serious threat to surrounding populations.
the immediate vicinity. The Chernobyl accident in Spent-fuel sites are usually not as heavily protected as
Ukraine is a case in point. An accident there released reactor cores and are perceived to be more vulnerable.
vast quantities of radioactive nuclear materials and Experts are trying to address this problem, which may
forced the permanent evacuation and abandonment of eventually be solved by creating a national storage site
a large swath of land in the vicinity. Radioactive fall- in a secure locations that would accept spent fuel from
out from the accident was detected throughout Europe reactor facilities.
in regions where wind carried the particulate matter Nations are responding to terrorist threats against
released in the plant explosion. reactors by trying to model various attack scenarios and
Terrorists might try to attack reactors in several devise appropriate responses. France was reported to
ways. An armed group might try to force its way into have placed surface-to-air antiaircraft missile batteries
the plant to take over the system and damage it inten- near some of its most sensitive nuclear facilities to
tionally to cause a release of materials. Since the guard against the possibility of suicide air attack. The
instrumentation systems that control such plants are United States has established “no-fly zones” over reac-
complex, such an effort would require considerable tors, but it is not clear how effective such zones would
knowledge of nuclear engineering and plant design be in the absence of round-the-clock combat air patrol
to succeed. The terrorists would also have to over- or the installation of antiaircraft missile batteries.
come intrinsic safeguards built into the system to
prevent accidents. Most nuclear plants have taken ATTACKS WITH IMPROVISED
steps to upgrade physical security systems to mini- RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
mize the probability that attackers could penetrate
them. Some legislators want federal security guards A radiological weapon is an improvised device
at all reactor sites and nuclear weapon laboratories designed to spread radioactive nuclear material over a