Page 35 - Encyclopedia Of Terrorism

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8———Agricultural Terrorism

TOOLS OF THE AGROTERRORIST of the BWC, but an outside observer may find
distinguishing between the development of a vaccine
Terrorists have or could develop the capability of and the development of a weapon under the cover of
using biological agents to attack crops and livestock; vaccine research difficult or impossible. Scientists
biological agents include viruses such as the highly involved in defensive agroterror research need sup-
contagious FMD and rinderpest, which kill or weaken plies of plant and animal pathogens. Terrorists seeking
cattle, sheep, pigs, and other livestock. Anti-plant these pathogens might obtain them from nations will-
agents include fungi such as rice blast and stem rust
ing to sponsor terrorist activities, by theft from research
that attack rice, wheat, and other important crops. Many
laboratories, or by misrepresenting themselves to
of these diseases are endemic in various parts of the
commercial suppliers of pathogens.
world, particularly in countries without well-developed
The United States has tightened standards consid-
procedures to monitor crop and animal health.
erably: it is no longer possible to merely invent a com-
Early detection is necessary to cull infected animals
pany name, print a letterhead, and obtain a pathogen
and destroy infected crops to keep diseases from spre-
from a supplier. Many other countries do not have
ading. Many of the diseases that terrorists are most
comparable safeguards. A small quantity of almost
likely to use occur naturally, thus a terrorist team could
any pathogen could easily be smuggled into the
travel to the scene of an outbreak to obtain infectious
United States by packaging it as a medicine. In addi-
material from a sick animal or crop. At the attack site,
tion, persons with modest training in microbiology
the pathogen could be administered clandestinely—any
can cultivate greater quantities of many pathogens if
resulting sickness would appear to be the result of nat-
supplied with a starter culture. Some animal diseases
ural causes. One expert has said, “If I wanted to spread
are so infectious that only a small quantity is needed
foot-and-mouth disease, I would just get a saliva smear
to start an infection that would sweep through herds if
from a sick cow and then rub it on the noses of some
not caught very early.
healthy cows in the country I wanted to attack.”
The development of biological agents explicitly for PREVENTION, DETECTION,
use against animals and crops has a long history. AND MITIGATION OF OUTBREAKS
Germany used anthrax and glanders against pack and
food animals in World War I. Germany and Japan con- Crops can be genetically engineered to make them
ducted active research during World War II to develop more resistant to pathogens, and their cultivation sched-
anticrop and antianimal weapons. They rarely used ules rotated to reduce the risk of exposing an entire crop
them, however, probably because they feared retalia- to a disease. Animals can be vaccinated against some of
tion in kind from the United States and its allies, the most threatening diseases. Growing conditions can
which were engaged in similar research. Some nations be optimized to reduce the spread of infection should a
may have refrained from using biological agents only disease outbreak occur, and antibiotic use can be mini-
because they feared the prospect of having the mized to reduce the risk of making livestock vulnerable
diseases spread to their own homelands. to attack with strains of antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
The United States ended its bioweapon program Factory farms that pack thousands of animals into con-
in 1969 and has honored its commitment to the fined spaces are likely to be very vulnerable and thus
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 particularly attractive to terrorists.
(BWC); this agreement outlawed offensive bioweapon Research laboratories in many parts of the world are
research and development and required signatories working on developing instruments that can detect and
to destroy their stockpiles. In the 1990s, citizens of identify pathogens quickly, eliminating the need for
the Soviet Union and Iraq reported that their countries long delays while waiting for laboratory reports. Swift
continued clandestine research programs. Some of exchange of information about agricultural diseases by
those bioweapons may still exist in stockpile sites or veterinary and crop specialists can be accomplished
laboratories, and in any case the knowledge needed to through computer and other information technolo-
cultivate these organisms is widespread and relatively gies. International organizations can cooperate to
easy to acquire. adopt measures to reduce the chance of a disease
Defensive biological warfare research such as crossing oceans. An outbreak of a highly infectious
vaccine development is permitted under the terms plant or animal disease on another continent is only a