Page 90 - Accelerating out of the Great Recession
P. 90

THE NEW REALITIES


        of political pressure being applied by governments worried about
        the cost of debt service on rapidly rising debts.” 11
           The return of inflation would lead to a significant drop in
        bond prices for governments and corporations, which would
        imply much higher interest rates. This, in turn, would have a neg-
        ative effect on the economy, potentially causing another recession
        and increasing the risk of deflation. Central banks will have to
        walk a very narrow line, and as they do so, the global economy
        may experience a period of increased volatility of price levels.
           Another factor affecting the inflation-deflation debate is the
        price of raw materials, particularly oil. Given the structural fac-
        tors of shrinking supply and increasing demand (especially from
        the emerging economies)—even in a lower growth environ-
        ment—it is quite possible that higher oil prices will become the
        norm. But this is not likely to lead to inflation because, given the
        weak economy, companies will not be able to pass on the higher
        costs to consumers. Companies thus will face reduced profits,
        and consumers, paying more for oil, will have less money to
        spend on other goods and services—a recipe for deflation.
           It is impossible to say how the battle between deflation and
        inflation will play out in the real economy in the years after the
        Great Recession. Even if inflation returns to the fore, the
        chances are that deflation will make a regular reappearance, as it
        did during Japan’s Lost Decade. This duality is a new reality that
        managers will have to come to terms with in the years ahead.





             ■ THE VICIOUS CIRCLE TO SLOWER GROWTH ■

        There is no doubt that the world economy faces a long period
        of lower growth. As we stated in Chapter 1, real GDP growth



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