Page 205 - An Introduction to Political Communication Fifth Edition

Intro to Politics Communication (5th edn)-p.qxp 9/2/11 10:55 Page 184

COMMUNICATING POLITICS
when military casualties and atrocities against civilians in war zones are
reported almost as soon as they occur; and when one side’s victories or defeats
cannot be hidden from the eyes and cameras of the thousands of corre-
spondents present in the modern conflict zone, those who wage war know that
they must include the impact of media coverage on public opinion in their
calculations. In liberal democratic countries, a supportive public opinion is just
as important in the pursuit of military conflict as well-resourced armies.
In some conflicts, of course, governments can take such support for
granted. During the Second World War it was not necessary to highlight
evidence of German atrocities against Jews and other groups in the countries
they controlled for the populations of the Allied countries to recognise the
menacing nature of Nazism. In this case, national survival was perceived to
be at stake.
Wars of national survival are rare, however. Indeed, it may be argued that
the Second World War was the only such conflict of the twentieth century
for the advanced capitalist world. War against the Soviet Union, had it ever
been allowed to break out, would have been another. But most conflicts are
fought over issues of territoriality, strategic resources or economic self-
interest. In such wars defeat may involve national humiliation and the
downfall of a government, but not the collapse of the society. Citizens,
therefore, are less likely to support them, and may actively campaign against
them, as occurred in both the Vietnam and the Falklands conflicts. Mercer
et al. note that ‘in a limited war, the relationship between politicians and the
media will be particularly sensitive; the government’s interest will not
necessarily be construed as identical to the national interest. [In] a time of
tension preceding a war, the potential power of the media to sway public
opinion is even greater’ (1987, p. 6). In these situations governments have to
‘manufacture’ consent for the pursuit of war, and manage opinion in such a
way that the war aims are achieved.
Opinion also matters on the international level. To embark on a major
military campaign like Operation Desert Storm, or the attack on Afghanistan
after September 11, the US and its allies required not only the support of their
own people, but that of the United Nations in its capacity as the collective
voice of the world community. Wars have been fought by big powers in the
absence of international endorsement, but the current political environment
is such that no country, no matter how powerful politically, can pursue major
military objectives in isolation. Early in 1998, when it appeared that the
Saddam regime was refusing to comply with United Nations’ resolutions on
weapons of mass destruction, a huge public relations effort was organised by
the US and British governments to prepare domestic opinion in both countries
for another military campaign against the Iraqi dictator. Like the first Gulf
War (see below) this was a necessary prerequisite for military action.
When yet another assault on Saddam Hussein was being prepared in the
autumn of 2002, much of the political debate in the West concerned whether

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