Page 120 - An Introduction to Political Communication Second Edition

ADVER TISING

it. Although the name of Reagan’s opponent in 1984, Walter Mondale,
was not mentioned in the ad, the film attempted to secure the
audience’s assent to the notion that another Reagan term was the
best defence America had against communism.
To manipulate mythology and deep-rooted cultural values in this
way implies a degree of sophistication in the market research carried
out by campaigners. Ronald Reagan’s electoral success has been
ascribed in large part to the market research efforts of key media
advisers like Dick Wirthlin and Roger Ailes, who successfully
identified the motivations and values underlying the voting behaviour
of key sectors of the American electorate. As former Conservative
media adviser Brendan Bruce puts it, Wirthlin’s value research for
the Reagan campaigns ‘represents the most important advance in
political communication of the last two decades. It provides the image
makers with the best possible guide to the effective presentation of
policy, by creating a clear understanding of how voters make their
choice of party. It also supplied them with a rich and subtle vocabulary
of persuasive language and motivating symbols’ (1992, p.87). As we
shall shortly see, such techniques are now also applied to the British
campaigning process.

Signifying power
Before leaving the subject of values, emotions and symbolism, we
should note the importance in political advertising of symbols of
power and status, and the advantages which these give to an
incumbent candidate or party. A candidate in office, such as Nixon
in 1972 and Reagan in 1984, inevitably acquires a stock of experience
and credibility which can be represented in advertisements by the
use of archive footage of press conferences, foreign tours, meetings
with international leaders, and so on. These visuals, with appropriate
verbal accompaniments, become powerful signifiers of authority
against a challenger whose administrative experience may be limited
to the governorship of a small state.
In 1988 George Bush made effective use of this device. Although
not himself an incumbent president, he deployed his considerable
experience as vice-president, and former head of the CIA and
Congress, to market himself as practically a president already. One
spot showed him in a protective embrace with Ronald Reagan
(signifying the trust and endorsement of the still-popular president),
meeting Gorbachov and Thatcher, and signing treaties—all images
of ‘presidentness’ to which Michael Dukakis had no response. Bush

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