Page 164 - An Introduction to Political Communication Second Edition
P. 164

POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS

            with Mr Kinnock’s image problem by giving a higher profile to
            attractive and able front-benchers. He should be protected from
            hazards, particularly from contact with the tabloids, and should
            appear in as many statesman-like settings as possible’ (Ibid., p.88).
            Thus, he was seen touring the country in a distinguished, ‘prime
            ministerial’ car, flanked by police outriders, and carrying himself
            with the bearing of one confidently on the verge of real political
            power. Slick, photogenic, and somewhat bland front-bench
            spokespersons like Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were preferred in
            public campaigning work to the more radical voices of John Prescott,
            Tony Benn, and Ken Livingstone.
              Such tactics were again insufficient, however, to deliver electoral
            success. Labour improved its position by comparison with the results
            of the 1987 election, but failed once more to deprive the Conservatives
            of an overall majority. In the aftermath of a fourth consecutive general
            election defeat, an internal debate began within the party which
            echoed earlier ambiguities about the value of political marketing.
            Once again, senior Labour voices could be heard decrying the
            pernicious influence of the image-makers, and asserting that Labour
            should dispense with them, or at least downgrade their role in
            campaigning. The SCA was accused of robbing the party of its
            socialist identity, in favour of red roses and gloss.
              Despite such criticisms, however, the election of Tony Blair as
            leader in July 1994 signalled the ascendancy of Labour’s
            imagemanagers; those like Patricia Hewitt, Peter Mandelson and
            others who believed that a Labour victory was conditional on ‘moving
            from a policy committee based process to a communication based
            exercise’ (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992, p.103). The astonishing,
            and unpredicted landslide election victory of May 1997 means that
            few will dare to challenge this approach in the forseeable future of
            British politics.
              The Conservatives, for their part, have also had problems with
            internal communication. Despite the success of its political marketing
            since the mid-1970s the party found itself in some difficulty in the
            1987 campaign. Confronted, on the one hand, by an unprecedentedly
            professional Labour campaign, their own efforts were hampered by
            a lack of co-ordination between key elements of the communications
            apparatus. Mrs Thatcher made a number of ‘gaffes’ during the
            campaign including, on Labour’s ‘health day’, her insistence on her
            moral right to attend a private hospital. Tory difficulties culminated
            in ‘wobbly Thursday’, when it began to seem that Labour might win
            the election. In the end, Tory fears were misplaced, and Mrs Thatcher

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