Page 126 - Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS)
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FROM PRINT TO IDENTIFICATION 111
The appearance of a SID number on a candidate list only shows the likeli-
hood that the minutiae of the prints match the minutiae of a record on the
database. State and local AFIS systems do not truly identify people; rather, they
report that the characteristics of the finger images sent by the inquiring agency
match the record of a person who has a record on the AFIS database. Whether
the original name is the true name is not known.
The following is an example. The first time Chris is fingerprinted, the sub-
mitting agency sends an inquiry with Chris’s prints to AFIS. Since Chris is not
enrolled in AFIS, there is no record and thus no match. Chris’s record is
assigned the next SID number of 1234567H. Six months later, Chris is again
fingerprinted in connection with a felony. When the booking officer asks Chris’s
name, he gives the name “Pat.”
The inquiring agency submits “Pat’s” fingerprint images to AFIS. The state
agency reports that they have a fingerprint match for someone named Chris.
Chris is therefore Pat, and may possibly use the name of someone else as well.
Or perhaps neither Chris nor Pat is the subject’s real name. The agency that
fingerprinted Pat has to determine who Pat/Chris really is. AFIS determined
that the finger images from Chris match the finger images from Pat, but making
the real identity falls outside the responsibility of AFIS.
One viewpoint holds that it is not immediately important to know the name
of a subject in custody. It is more important to determine whether the subject
is wanted, has outstanding warrants, is dangerous, etc. There is another point
to this example. To be nearly 100% certain of someone’s history using only one
biometric, fingerprints must be used. Regardless of whether names, social secu-
rity numbers, dates of birth, or court records match, the only true, nearly
absolute method for identification is to use fingerprints.
Misidentifications can happen, but they are increasingly rare. Having two or
four clear finger images almost always produces the correct subject if the can-
didate is enrolled on the database. Can there really be errors in other identi-
fiers such as date of birth and Social Security number? Of course. These errors
are exploited in the relatively recent phenomenon of identity theft. Financial
institutions, particularly credit companies, urge people to check their credit
history regularly because of the very real possibility that someone has gathered
sufficient non-biometric information about them to be able to assume their
identity. Criminal justice systems cannot afford to make a misidentification.
Unlike an error in one’s credit report, which can be corrected relatively easily,
a misidentification can have far greater consequences. Criminal charges may
be imposed on the wrong person, or the criminal history of a non-criminal
applicant may be missed, allowing an applicant to be placed in a position from
which he or she should be barred.