Page 161 - Battleground The Media Volume 1 and 2

1 0 | Embedd ng Journal sts: How Close Is Too Close?

was no reporting, images, or even documentation of one of the biggest armored
battles ever fought. In addition, the Pentagon had been criticized for restrict-
ing the press, first during the invasion of Grenada in 1983 by the Sidle com-
mission, and again by a Defense Department report after the Panama invasion
that concluded that the failure of the pool arrangement resulted in stories and
pictures of dubious quality. Though the media coverage of the first Gulf War was
highly positive, particularly after the fighting started, the Pentagon was roundly
criticized for press restrictions. Embedding was viewed as the solution to the
problem of battlefield access. It was seen as a process that would be able to take
advantage of the considerable resources of the media, but under controlled con-
ditions more favorable to the military.

PuBLiC rELaTions

Since World War II, the distinctions between military information opera-
tions (psyops), public diplomacy, and public affairs have been blurred with each
new war, but the evidence is that the development of the embeds policy and
its implementation in the United States was largely driven by a public relations
agenda. Even as it promised a lack of “blanket censorship,” the Pentagon did
not hide its desire to shape positive coverage of the invasion of Iraq. As for-
mer war correspondents and alternative media were reporting stories critical of
the new relationship between the Pentagon and the media, embedding, it was
discovered, was the brainchild of Assistant Defense Secretary Victoria Clarke.
Clarke’s public relations experience included working for Hill and Knowlton,
the PR firm responsible for promoting the false baby-incubator story from the
first Gulf war.

ThE ExCiTEmEnT oF invasion
With embedding, the invasion of Iraq resembled other television productions
in which journalists and media producers follow their subjects in unscripted
shows designed to give a sense of authenticity and excitement. On U.S. tele-
vision, war coverage mirrored reality shows (such as Cops) and camera and
journalistic perspectives merged into a point of view united with the military ef-
fort. Empowered by riding shotgun with the soldiers, journalists on U.S. media
barely contained their excitement. They wore goggles, flack jackets, and even
reported through gas masks as they adopted military jargon; “There are boots
on the ground.” They interviewed top-gun pilots and crawled along the ground
with gunfire in the distance, pressing microphones into soldiers’ faces as they
pointed their weapons.
So surreal was the experience that newscasters felt compelled to tell view-
ers that the images they were seeing were live, not a movie. Coverage of the
Iraq invasion in the United Kingdom, where journalists covered British troops,
had similar effects. There is an irony here, of course, in which the verisimili-
tude of frontline reporting appears to create a sense of unreality. It explains,
nonetheless, the findings of an Independent Television Commission survey in