Page 91 - Berkshire Encyclopedia Of World History Vol Two

440 berkshire encyclopedia of world history

An atmosphere of mistrust and unease settled over East–
Containment West relations.

policy aimed at containing, or restricting, a hostile or George Kennan
Apotentially hostile power through use of diplomacy and Containment
and possibly force is referred to as containment. Histor- On 22 February 1946 George Kennan (b. 1904), a staff
ical examples of containment include the coalitions member of the American embassy in Moscow, and long-
designed to contain French power in Europe during the time Soviet expert, sent a document analyzing Soviet pol-
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, or Chinese icy to his superiors in Moscow. Kennan’s analysis became
attempts to contain Vietnamese and Soviet influence in known as the “Long Telegram,” and was published in
Southeast Asia after 1975. Containment can also be seen 1947 in the influential American journal Foreign Affairs.
in the actions of Britain on the eve of World War II. Dur- The journal editors attributed the article to “Mr. X,” even
ing the mid-to late 1930s the British government pursued though it was generally known that “Mr. X” was actually
a diplomatic strategy known as appeasement in dealing George Kennan. Kennan’s analysis of Soviet foreign pol-
with Nazi Germany. However Hitler proved unappeas- icy found widespread support in Washington and soon
able and uninterested in long-term peaceful solutions.The became the theoretical basis of containment.
Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 Kennan believed that the USSR, for ideological and
meant the end of appeasement. Instead the British historic reasons, was an inherently expansionist power. In
resorted to containment by issuing a series of territorial order to justify their tyranny, Kennan argued, the Soviet
guarantees to countries in Eastern Europe, most notably leaders had to convince their people that the USSR was
Poland. According to the guarantee, should Poland find threatened by hostile capitalist powers.The Soviets would
itself attacked by Germany, Britain would come to its seek to expand territorially because that had been the pat-
defense. In this manner, the British were attempting to tern of Russian history. Surrounded by hostile nomadic
contain German power in Europe.The Germans attacked tribes, living on an open, vulnerable plain, Russian rulers
Poland on 1 September 1939 and Britain declared war had found security in conquest.As well, Communist ide-
on Germany two days later.The term “containment” has ology demanded that workers in foreign countries be “lib-
many historical examples but is usually associated with erated.” Kennan noted that if the Soviets were confronted
the policy followed by the United States toward the at one point they would simply retreat and seek to ex-
USSR during the Cold War. pand somewhere else. Kennan thought that the Soviets
could not be trusted in negotiations.They might agree to
Origins of Cold War tactical concessions but would never give up on their his-
Containment toric mission. However, Kennan did not believe that the
The months immediately following the end of the World Soviets wanted war, since they took a long-term view and
War II saw deterioration in relations between the West- were content to wait for historical trends to play them-
ern powers and the Soviet Union, who had formerly been selves out. Since the collapse of capitalism was inevitable,
allies in the war against the Axis states. British and according to Communist theory, there was no need to
American statesmen watched in alarm as the Soviets take dangerous risks. Kennan recommended that the
solidified their control over Eastern Europe. The Soviets United States pursue “a policy of firm containment,
seemed to be threatening Turkey and Iran, while a Com- designed to confront the Russians with unalterable
munist insurgency in Greece steadily gained force. The counter-force at every point where they show signs of
Americans and British also blamed the Soviets for the encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable
slow pace of talks over the future of occupied Germany. world” (Kennan 1947, 581). Kennan speculated that if