Page 365 - Encyclopedia Of World History Vol IV
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1666 berkshire encyclopedia of world history



                                        The difference between a historian and a poet is not that one writes in prose and the
                                      other in verse—indeed the writings of Herodotus could be put into verse and yet would
                                         still be a kind of history, whether written in meter or not. The real difference is this,



            revised. So Kuhn distinguished between normal science,  for realism [the doctrine that science provides an accurate
            the slow, sometimes plodding process by which scientists  description of the real world] is that it is the only philos-
            flesh out the implications of a well-established para-  ophy that does not make the success of science a miracle”
            digm, and scientific revolutions, or periods when an  (Psillos 1999, 71).
            established paradigm breaks down and is replaced with  The apparent impossibility of finding any rigorous
            a new one.                                          way of defining what is distinctive about modern science
              Though Kuhn’s ideas may have offered a more realis-  suggests that science may not be as different from other
            tic portrayal of how science actually works, they provided  systematic forms of knowledge as is often supposed. All
            weak support for its truth claims and failed to account for  knowledge systems, even those of animals, offer maps of
            its explanatory power, for it was easy to point to other  reality that provide more or less accurate guides to mate-
            knowledge systems, including most forms of religion, in  rial reality. Perhaps, as the historian Steven Shapin has
            which there existed a core body of ideas that were taken  argued, the scientific revolution does not mark as clear an
            on trust but were sometimes violently overthrown. To  epistemological break as was once assumed. Most seven-
            some, it began to seem that all we could say about sci-  teenth-century scientists were well aware of the continu-
            ence was that it was better at solving the sorts of prob-  ities between their ideas and those of the medieval and
            lems that need to be solved in modern societies.    ancient worlds. Indeed, Newton, like many other scientists
            Instrumentalist theories of science argue that it does not  of his epoch, continued to study alchemy even as he was
            really matter whether or not scientific theories are true—  laying the foundations of what many think of today as true
            all that matters is whether they work. Science is best  science. Even the notion of a scientific revolution is a mod-
            thought of not as a more or less accurate description of  ern idea; the phrase was first coined in 1939, by the philo-
            reality, but rather as a tool—the mental equivalent of a  sophical historian Alexandre Koyré (1892–1964).
            stone axe or a computer. Or, to adopt a more precise  Developments in the twentieth century have done
            analogy, it is like a map of reality. As Michael Polanyi has  even more to blur the distinction between modern sci-
            written: “all theory may be regarded as a kind of map  ence and other systematic forms of knowledge. Quantum
            extended over space and time”. Similarly,Thomas Kuhn  physics and chaos theory have shown that reality itself is
            has argued that scientific theory “provides a map whose  fuzzier than was once supposed, a conclusion that has
            details are elucidated by mature scientific research. And  forced scientists to abandon the nineteenth-century hope
            since nature is too complex and varied to be explored at  of attaining a mechanically perfect description of reality.
            random, that map is as essential as observation and  As a result, the differences between the sciences and the
            experiment to science’s continuing development” (Kuhn  social sciences appear much less clear-cut than they once
            1970, p. 109). Like all knowledge systems, science offers  did. This is particularly true of historical scientific disci-
            simplified and partial maps of some aspects of the real  plines, such as cosmology or biology. Insofar as they try
            world. But it is not the same as reality.           to describe changes in the past, specialists in these fields
              A last-ditch attempt to preserve the idea that science  face the same dilemmas as historians; far from basing
            can provide an accurate account of reality is the delight-  conclusions on repeatable laboratory experiments, they
            ful no-miracles argument advanced by the philosopher  try, like historians, to reconstruct a vanished past from
            Hilary Putnam (b. 1926). Putnam argued that if a theory  fragments left randomly to the present.
            works, then the simplest explanation of that fact is to  As the borders between the sciences and other modern
            assume that the theory provides a good description of the  disciplines have blurred, the idea of science as a quite dis-
            real world. On this argument, it is the success of modern  tinct form of knowledge has become harder to defend.
            science that justifies its claims to provide accurate descrip-  Careful observation leading to technological innovation
            tions of reality.As Putnam puts it,“The positive argument  is a feature of most human societies, while general
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