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APPENDIX: BIOLOGICAL COGNITION
3.A.1 Introduction
This Appendix sketches the author’s confabulation theory of animal cognition. The discussion is
focused on the biological implementation of cognition in human cerebral cortex and thalamus
(hereinafter, often referred to jointly as thalamocortex).
The enormous diversity of animal life, currently ranging in size from single cells (the smallest
animals which have ever lived) to blue whales (the largest), and ranging in adaptation across a huge
range of biomes, obfuscates its unity. All animal cells function using very similar basic biochemical
mechanisms. These mechanisms were developed once and have been genetically conserved across
essentially all species. Mentation is similar. The basic mechanism of cognition is, in the view of this
theory, the same across all vertebrates (and possibly invertebrates, such as octopi and bees, as well).
The term cognition, as used in this Appendix, is not meant to encompass all aspects of
mentation. It is restricted to (roughly) those functions carried out by the human cerebral cortex
and thalamus. Cognition is a big part of mentation for certain vertebrate species (primates, cats,
dogs, parrots, ravens, etc.), but only a minor part for others (fish, reptiles, etc.). Frog cognition
exists, but is a minor part of frog mentation. In humans, cognition is the part of mentation of which
we are, generally, most proud; and most want to imitate in machines.
An important concept in defining cognition is to consider function; not detailed physiology. In
humans, the enormous expansion of cerebral cortex and thalamus has allowed a marked segregation
of cognitive function to those organs. Birds can exhibit impressive cognitive functions (Pepperberg,
1999; Weir et al., 2002). However, unlike the case in humans, these cognitive functions are
probably not entirely confined to a single, neatly delimited, laminar brain nucleus. Even so, the
theory hypothesizes that the underlying mathematics of cognition is exactly the same in all
vertebrate species (and probably in invertebrates); even though the neuronal implementation varies