Page 110 - Cinematic Thinking Philosophical Approaches to the New Cinema
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100  James  Phillips

        masterpiece  nonetheless  does  not  cease  to  be  beautiful,  it  is  because  its
        institutionalization  brings  it  to  teeter  on  the  edge  of  kitsch,  thereby  re-
        storing  it  to  the  disputability  of  the  beautiful.  The  "aura"  of  the  work
        of art,  which  Walter  Benjamin  denounces  as  a vestige  of  the  cultic,  can
        be  explained  also  in  terms  of the  shimmer  of  objective  uncertainty  with
        which  aesthetic  judgment  recognizes  a  specific  work  of art  as  beautiful.
        The beautiful  cannot  be pinned  down  as an  objective trait. In  its nomadic
        itinerary, abandoning what was considered beautiful  for something new, it
        resembles  a swarm  of locusts in  search  of fresh  sustenance. In  its  appetite
        for the new, beauty  is comparable to imperialism;  nevertheless, where im-
        perialism  aspires to a universal  of control, beauty appeals to a universal  of
        dissent. It calls forth  to community by means of its invocation of universal
        validity, yet  it disavows the community  able to read  off its unity from  the
        unequivocality of an object. The subjectively universal validity of aesthetic
        judgments  is strictly unpresentable, since the appeal is being made not to a
        property of the object whose stability  is the condition  of universally bind-
        ing judgments  with  respect  to  it but  to  the  universality  that  inhabits  the
        judging subject  in  its irreducibility to its empirically conditioned  desires,
             The universalism  of aesthetic judgment  is its possibility rather  than
        its actuality. The community of aesthetic judgment  can never realize itself
        as the  truth  and  decidability  of what  is—in  short,  it  can  never  mistake
        itself  for  the  majority—because  it  is  in  possibility,  in  thought's  over-
        reaching of the actual, that  Kantian humanity  comes into the  insubstan-
        tial community proper to it as a community of thinking beings. Thought
        is not  an  activity  of  an  actual  subject  but  rather  the  possibilities  within
        which  the  actual  is  a point  of  realization.  That  which  unites  humanity
        is  the  possibility  of  a  contestation  of what  is.  This  contestation  results
        from  the  existence  of thought  rather  than  from  the  existential  neutrality
        of the  general  concept. Actuality  is even  the moment  in which  existence
        comes  closest  to the  existential  neutrality  of the concept,  insofar  as what
        is offers  the decidability  of its actuality to the concept  as a point  of entry:
        actuality  is existence's hour  of metaphysical  temptation.
             If we think  at  all,  it  is community  that  thinks  in  us, breaching  the
        hermetism  of the particular.  Kant, who  is often  passed  off  as the philoso-
        pher  of liberal democracies, elaborates  a conception  of sociability that  has
        nothing to do with  the extrinsic harmony  of selfish  interests. Should  it be
        objected  that the transcendental  dignity of a sociability of thought  is like-
        wise  far  removed  from  the humiliations  of the daily political  struggles  of
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