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the challenge to regulation has been less, because there was less regulation, we
find, nevertheless, a flood of critical studies of the performance of press and
broadcasting in relation to news, politics and cultural values (e.g. Picard, 1985;
Entman, 1989; Kellner, 1989; Bogart, 1995; Fallows, 1996). In Western Europe,
there is anxiety about the effects of transnational and commercial trends on
traditional values which used to be upheld by broadcasting and other quality
media (e.g. Blumler, 1992). Concern is even stronger and more justified in
Eastern Europe and Russia, where systems of publicly controlled media have
largely disintegrated and commercialism operates in the least favourable
economic conditions for serving public purpose as well as profit (Androunas,
1993; Paletz et al., 1995; Price, 1995). It seems that in Japan too, television has
received some of the blame for recent crises of society. [...]
We can summarize the situation outlined above as a potential crisis of media
accountability to society, meaning essentially a breakdown in the systems by
which media have been led or constrained in the past to put the interests of
society on a par with their self-interest. This article is concerned with two main
questions. First of all, how should we adapt existing media accountability
institutions to changing conditions? Second, in doing so, how can we square the
circle of reconciling media freedom with media accountability? In order to
answer these questions it is necessary to examine the meaning of the
accountability concept and to consider the various forms it takes. I will propose
a framework of analysis for media accountability, evaluate the merits and
demerits of the means available for dealing with the dilemma outlined above
and suggest some lines of action which are both coherent and consistent with
media freedom.

Assumptions

In doing so, I make certain basic assumptions, which I do not have time here to
support by argument. One assumption is that there is such a thing as a public
interest, despite the problems of practice and principle mentioned. Second,
‘society’ can still legitimately hold the media, as one of its key institutions, to
account on public interest grounds. Essentially the public interest is expressed in
the form of (often competing) claims, based on certain values and principles,
which have to be settled in some political or judicial forum (McQuail, 1992).
Third, accountability need not be fundamentally inconsistent with liberty, if only
because the full notion of freedom cannot be detached from ideas of respon-
sibility. Nor does accountability have to take the form of more regulation. All the
same, accountability does in practice often entail limits on freedom to publish
and any claims and sanctions which are backed by society have to be consistent
with reigning principles of freedom.
Although I cannot argue in detail for these assumptions, there are pragmatic
grounds for accepting them, since contemporary societies which do value and
protect liberty of expression also maintain quite extensive controls over media,
which at least set limits to what can be published without risk of sanction.