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News Production in Contemporary Russia: Practices of Power 231

Although creating a hierarchy of sources is not impossible, often their power
is unstable and has to be assessed separately in each situation, on the basis of
incomplete information. One of the most indicative (and verifiable) examples is
connected with my own journalistic investigation (though it was during my par-
ticipant observation at a newspaper editorial office, not in television). I was
threatened on the phone by an NGO representative whom I was going to inter-
view. I told my boss that I had no idea if this person had enough power to act on
his threats, and if this ‘NGO’ might be just a cover for criminal activities. I asked
to take my name off the publication, but my boss decided the threat was not
dangerous and published it (which happily was not followed by any harmful
consequences). Later my respondents confirmed that such indeterminate situa-
tions were typical.
Both journalists and sources are active in their game. Journalists elaborate and
maintain a network of permanent sources, they initiate searches for new ones,
they check one source against another, use informal connections – in short, they
implement the entire range of instruments known to their colleagues worldwide.
However, sources have some resources which are not typical in western countries.
For example, there are many different degrees of secrecy of documents and
places, whose lists are relatively easily expanded both legally and semi-legally
(Glasnost Defence Foundation, 1998b: 70). During my research, reporters were
denied the right to film a blown-up gas container; the reasoning was that the
enterprise where the accident took place was ‘classified’, even though journalists
were not going to show these secret objects. The institutional position of sources
gives them multiform possibilities to invent various other methods for concealing
information. For example, once during my observation journalists approached
custom officials for basic information about a man suspected of smuggling. He
had been arrested at the Russian border the day before. The officials first denied
the mere fact of the arrest and a few hours later refused to give any details, insist-
ing that their investigation was not completed. Such practices are encouraged
by less elaborate legislation (in comparison with western countries) and by
differences in cultural-normative traditions.
On the other hand, the fluidity of all structures, including legislation and cor-
porate solidarity, results in both easier leaks and more possibilities for illegal
management of information by journalists (both in terms of access and publica-
tion). One of my respondents told me how he, before his departure for the first
Chechen war, was advised to buy several issues of Playboy magazine. These were
then presented to soldiers at the check-posts, and in some cases the gifts quickly
solved the problem of access to restricted battle zones. If that did not help, the
journalist offered soldiers the unique opportunity to call home from his mobile
phone (which was more expensive). This story shows how journalists may infor-
mally expand the sphere of their autonomy, and such tactics cannot be traced by
formal institutional analysis.
An alternative strategy to concealing unfavourable information is the persis-
tent supply of favourable information, which pre-empts and sidelines journal-
ists’ independent investigation. Information produced by press services and
public relations offices of different institutions has its pros and cons for journal-
ists. It is easily accessible but does not fully fit their criteria of newsworthiness.