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4X                         What  Is  Universal  Pragmatics?

           I  have  not  explained  the  embedding  of  communicative  action
         (“oriented  to  reaching  understanding’’)  in  other  types  of  action.
         It  seems  to  me  that  strategzc  action  (‘‘oriented  to  the  actor’s  suc-
         cess’’—in  general,  modes  of  action  that  correspond  to  the  utili-
         tarian  model  of  purposive-rational  action)  as  well  as  (the  still-
         insufficiently-analyzed)  symbolic  action  (e.g.,  a  concert,  a  dance
         —in  general,  modes  of  action  that  are  bound  to  nonpropositional
         systems  of  symbolic  expression)  differ  from  communicative  action
         in  that  individual  validity  claims  are  suspended  (in  strategic
         action,  truthfulness,  in  symbolic  action,  truth).**  My  previous
         analyses  of  ‘‘labor’’  and  “interaction”  have  not  yet  adequately
         captured  the  most  general  differentiating  characteristics  of  instru-
         mental  and  social  (or  communicative)  action.  I  cannot  pursue
         this  desideratum  here.


         On  the  Double  Structure  of  Speech

         I  would  like  to  come  back  now  to  the  characteristic  double
         structure  that  can  be  read  off  the  standard  form  of  speech  actions.
         Obviously  the  two  components,  the  illocutionary  and  the  proposi-
         tional,  can  vary  independently  of  one  another.  We  can  hold  a
         propositional  content  invariant  vis-a-vis  the  different  types  of
         speech  acts  in  which  it  appears.  In  this  abstraction  of  proposi-
         tional  content  from  the  asserted  proposition,  a  fundamental  ac-
         complishment  of  our  language  is  expressed.  Propositionally
         differentiated  speech  distinguishes  itself  therein  from  the  sym-
         bolically  mediated  interaction  we  can  already  observe  among
         primates.**  Any  number  of  examples  of  the  speech-act-invariance
         of  propositional  content  can  be  provided—for  instance,  for  the
         propositional  content  “Peter’s  smoking  a  pipe’’  the  following:
                “T  assert  that  Peter  smokes a  pipe.”’

                 “T  beg  of  you  (Peter)  that  you  smoke a  pipe.”
                “Task  you  (Peter),  do  you  smoke  a  pipe?”’
                “I  warn  you  (Peter),  smoke  a  pipe.”

           In  a  genetic  perspective,  the  speech-act-invariance  of  proposi-
         tional  contents  appears  as  an  uncoupling  of  illocutionary  and
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