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114          Communication,  Commerce and Power

           range of corporate interests would be directly affected by the outcome
           of the conference,  American state officials invested an extraordinary
           amount of preparatory work. According to Michael Stoil:

             Adverse actions by the conference could potentially have prevented
             expansion  of  AM  radio  broadcasting  in  the  US,  delayed
             development  of critical  electronic warfare equipment,  reduced  the
             effectiveness  of  the  Voice  of  America,  scuttled  [potential]  US
             proposals  for  direct  broadcasting  satellites  .... Interest  in  W ARC
             among  suppliers  and  users  of  telecommunication  services  and
             equipment  was  understandably  high,  and  participation  in  US
             preconference activities was unusually high  .... Some commentators
             warned  that  radical  lesser-developed  countries  would  use  the
             concept  of  the  New  World  Information  [and  Communication]
             Order to rally  support against benefits enjoyed by the technically-
             advanced countries in the existing Radio Regulations. 25

             Although  the State Department Office  of International Commun-
           ications  Policy  (OICP)  - later  reformed  and  enlarged  into  the
           Bureau  of International  Communications  and  Information  Policy -
           was put in charge of the US delegation in  1976 because of its official
           responsibility  for  foreign  relations  concerning  communications,
           within  a  year  President  Carter  opted  to  appoint  a  special  ambas-
           sador  to  coordinate  the  US  effort.  Two  reasons  were  given.  First,
           the  OICP was  deemed  to  be  too  small and lacking in  the  resources
           needed  to  prepare  for  the  conference.  Second,  because  the  State
           Department  was  not  responsible  for  implementing  domestic
           communications  policy,  other  agencies  possessing  this  expertise  and
           holding  established  relationships  with  key  private  sector  interests
           were seen to be more desirable pre-WARC coordinators. Preliminary
           preparations for  W ARC-79  were  made  by  President Nixon's  Office
           of Telecommunications  Policy.  Under  Carter,  the  OTP's  successor,
           the  NTIA,  became  the  lead  agency.  However,  due  to  the  direct
           responsibility  held  by  the  Federal Communications Commission for
           domestic  issues,  FCC  officials  argued  that  they  should  take  charge
           of the  W ARC preparations in  consultation with  the  Department of
           State.  When, in  1977,  Carter attempted an inter-agency compromise
           by  naming  Glenn  Robinson  (a  law  professor  and  a  former  FCC
           Commissioner)  as  the  WARC-79  chair  and  the  US  ambassador-
           designate  for  the  conference,  while  also  naming  three  vice-chairs  -
           one  representative  from  the  NTIA,  one  from  the  FCC,  and  one
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