Page 36 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia
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Struggle for moderate Islam in Malaysia 25
              Despite its attempts to control internet media sources, it was not until 2004 that
            the government acted to shut down radical Islamist websites being hosted on
            Malaysian ISPs. The catalyst was the discovery of a site containing video footage
            of a US citizen being de-capitated in Iraq. It was subsequently discovered that the
            Malaysian web hosting company also provided space for other sites linked to al
            Qaeda, Hamas and the Chechen independence movement. The government now
            claims that it will not allow any web page or company that operates on behalf of
            terrorists. Malaysia’s cyber laws state that they are not designed to censor but do
            allow for action against sites that are indecent, obscene, and incite hatred or
            launch personal attacks against individuals (BBC News Online 2004d).
              The effects of these media controls are compounded by deficiencies in media
            practice. In particular, there is lack of analysis when reporting on official state-
            ments about the extent of the terror network in Southeast Asia. The mainstream
            media seem content to accept at face value what the authorities, or those claiming
            to be terrorism experts, tell them, when there is little hard evidence to back up
            those claims (Asia Times Online 2002b).


            The KMM–Media relationship
            The relationship between the KMM and the Malaysian media does not reflect a
            typical media terrorist relationship. To start with, the mainstream media typically
            labels the KMM as a ‘militant’ or an ‘extremist’ group, rather than a ‘terrorist’
            group. These labels are not defined, but the media implicitly links the KMM with
            terrorism in numerous articles that highlight it’s links with JI and al Qaeda, which
            are defined as terrorist groups.
              The KMM is also not currently engaged in a campaign of violence within
            Malaysia and so is not using violence as a means of gaining access to the media.
            Neither does it release communiques through the media as bin Laden has done
            through al Jazeera. Neither is there any indication that the KMM operates a web-
            site. The overall result is that the KMM is failing to use the media to publicize its
            militant Islamist ideology and objectives.
              There are occasional reports in the media warning of possible KMM and JI
            attacks within Malaysia (Malay Mail 2003b) and even a report that some members
            of the KMM were willing to become suicide bombers (Malay Mail 2002e). And
            there have also been reports linking the KMM to a number of crimes over the years,
            even though KMM complicity in these crimes remains unproven. In 2004 a New
            Straits Times article linked the KMM to a number of murders and robberies and
            claimed that KMM members had became an ‘anonymous conveyor belt of violence
            against non-believers’. In response, Harakah Daily published a rebuttal by Gerakan
            Mansuhkan ISA (GMI), a movement that is working to abolish the ISA, which
            reminded readers that the KMM had not been proven to be responsible for any of
            the mentioned crimes (Harakah Daily 2004b). The emphasis in this reporting is also
            that this violence, and potential violence, is directed at overthrowing the Malaysian
            government, thereby distancing it from bin Laden’s war against the US. This report-
            ing helps to maintain the public perception that the KMM is committed to violence,
            and remains a potential threat, although the level of this reporting is not so great as
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