Page 81 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

70 Benjamin Cole
These reports reflect the attitudes of hard line local politicians such as Emmanuel
Pinol, the governor of Cotobato province (BBC News Online 2003). Yet the MILF
are not without some support in the media, one editorial in the Sun Star Davao
suggested that

Compared to the [NDF] the chances of forging a peace accord with the MILF
are a lot better. For one thing they’re after their own land and are not out to
conquer the whole country and impose their own brand of culture, religion
and politics – at least that’s how it appears so far.
(Sun Star Davao 2004a)

There is still a tendency for media reporting of the propaganda war between the
MILF and the government to reflect the cock fighting analogy. Many reports
merely publish government claims followed by MILF counter-claims, with little
analysis. When the ceasefire was broken by skirmishes during 2004 and 2005
the MILF used the media to deny responsibility, or to claim that specific attacks
were conducted by renegade elements acting independently (Inq7.net 2005a).
The more hard line elements of the media question whether it is possible to
engage in a peace process with an organisation which still resorts to violence and
uses MILF violence as evidence to support the argument for using military force
to achieve peace before entering negotiations to find a political solution. In
failing to provide analysis or background information, however, the media is
doing nothing to explain and clarify the situation.
The biggest problem for the MILF is the persistent reporting of allegations about
its links to al Qaeda through the ASG and JI, which could lead to it being labelled a
terrorist organisation. While the media reports these allegations, it remains unclear
whether the links are at a personal level with individual MILF fighters or whether
there are institutional links between the three groups. The MILF has admitted train-
ing foreign and local Islamic militants in the past but stresses that this stopped as part
of its commitment to the peace process. There is little evidence of institutional links
between the two groups, but there are links between individuals in both groups, and
perhaps between JI and individual MILF units which are no longer under the control
of the MILF high command. And MILF leaders have not denied that there may be
individuals within its ranks who subscribe to radical ideas and may have linked up
with the JI in defiance of the MILF leadership (Manila Bulletin 2004h). This is a
major issue but reporting of it has been poor. Both sides of the argument are
reported, but allegations from official sources are reported more often than MILF
statements, and the media fails to engage in any significant analysis of the issue.
The MILF leadership is sensitive to the consequences of being labelled a
terrorist organisation for fear of being isolated, both financially and politically. The
government knows this and has used the media to exploit this sensitivity. In May
2003, following a wave of MILF raids and bombings which claimed nearly 100
lives, the government suspended peace negotiations and debated whether to desig-
nate the MILF as a terrorist group (Inq7.net 2003b). In the end the government
chose not to; but it plays a careful game of publicly keeping the pressure on, whilst