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160                        Shea Esterling


                             debate  concerning  the  repatriation  of  cultural  objects  [Audi,  p.  131].
                             Kennedy‘s  legal  semiotics  involves  a  four-step  process.  However,  for  the
                             purposes of this analysis, the most important steps to review are Audi‘s use of
                             the first and second steps as these set the foundation for unmasking a divided
                             discourse.  According  to  Kennedy,  the  first  step  of  a  legal  semiotic  analysis
                             entails a lexicographical or ‗mapping‘ task  of identifying the most common
                             argument- bites in the selected area of legal argument under scrutiny. Kennedy
                             understands legal argument to mean an argument either in favor or against a
                             ―particular resolution of a gap, conflict, or ambiguity in the system of legal
                             rules‖ (Kennedy, p. 325).
                                 What makes something an argument-bite ―is nothing more nor less than
                             that people use it over and over again….with a sense that they are making a
                             move, or placing a counter in the game of the argument‖ [Kennedy, p. 329].
                             Next, as Kennedy suggests, a legal semiotic analysis explores the formation of
                             argument-bites into pairs and further into clusters. The pairing of argument-
                             bites  stems  from  the  fact  that  within  legal  argument  the  practice  is  to  use
                             stereo-typed argument-bites to support one position or another and so results
                             in their existence as opposed pairs of maxims and counter-maxims [Kennedy,
                             p. 327]. In turn, each argument-bite is ―associated in the minds of the arguers
                             not  with  one  but  a  variety  of  counter-bites‖  [Kennedy,  p.  329].  Therefore
                             argument-bites are necessarily relatively structured, which means then that so
                             is every legal argument within a legal culture [Kennedy, p. 329]. In turn, Audi
                             identifies ―argument-bites in pairs as they often appear in court cases and law
                             review  articles‖  [Audi,  p.  133].  Careful  to  stress  to  the  reader  to  avoid
                             assessing  the  strengths  of  the  arguments  in  context  in  the  same  vein  as
                             Kennedy, Audi identifies and provides examples, though not exhaustively, of
                             five  main  groups  of  argument-bites  in  pairs,  including  competence,  moral,
                             rights, administrability and historical arguments [Audi, p. 134-6]. According
                             to Kennedy, the second step of a legal semiotic analysis then involves placing
                             these  pairs  into  clusters,  which  refer  to  a  set of  arguments  used  together in
                             relation to a particular legal issue [Kennedy, p. 339]. The central point is that
                             when the bite is heard as a result of the opponent‘s use of it within a particular
                             doctrinal context, that the other members of the cluster are already in mind
                             [Kennedy, p. 341]. In turn, these clusters give argument-bites their meaning
                             and the overarching legal argument gets its ―intelligibility, from the system of
                             connections  between  bites‖  [Kennedy,  p.  337].  Again,  following  from
                             Kennedy, Audi  arranges argument-bites typically used together into clusters
                             [Audi, p. 137]. He identifies some clusters in the cultural property argument
                             such  as  the  applicability  of  source  nations‘  laws  in  market  nation  courts,
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