Page 147 - Creating Spiritual and Psychological Resilience

116 Creating Spiritual and Psychological Resilence

The faith communities still had concerns. Their highest accountabil-
ity was to their membership, and they wanted to report back to their
membership about what they had done. They worried that, although this
was an effective tool, it would ultimately be seen as a Lutheran initiative.
They wanted to move the 9/11 Roundtable from being managed through
Lutheran Social Services to an organization that would be perceived to
be neutral. Having a functional program to run, a political will evolved
between the faith communities to create a formal structure for their coor-
dination and collaborative efforts. With the leadership of the Council of
Churches of Greater New York, the Board of Rabbis, UMCOR, Lutheran
Disaster Response, the American Baptists, and the Presbytery of New
York (among others), New York Disaster Interfaith Services (NYDIS) was
born and formally incorporated by the end of 2002. The NYC 9/11 Unmet
needs Roundtable moved to NYDIS and its role as a tool for community-
wide disaster recovery evolved.

Stage Two: 9/11 Roundtable and New York
Disaster Interfaith Services (2003–2005)

On a few occasions, long-term recovery organizations have proved
their capacity to enhance an agency’s ability to advocate for the evolv-
ing needs of communities as a disaster’s full impact unfolds. The most
notable use of this tool for advocacy in 9/11 recovery was the partner-
ing of the United Services Group, the New York Immigration Coalition
and the faith communities with other agencies to argue for expansion
of FEMA’s Mortgage and Rental Assistance (MRA) program. Shortly
after the World Trade Center attack FEMA had inserted the term “direct
victim” into eligibility criteria and incorporated the use of geographic
boundaries—Houston Street and below—to determine eligibility of
“direct” victims. Many leaders expressed immediate concern that these
decisions, especially use of geographic boundaries to define individual’s
eligibility for aid, created arbitrary criteria that excluded thousands of
direct victims from aid.
With an estimated 75,000 to 100,000 jobs (in New York City alone) lost
due to the World Trade Center attack during the last fiscal quarter of 2001,
FEMA’s MRA program had significant impact on the lives of New Yorkers
in the wake of the World Trade Center attack. Prior to 9/11 FEMA’s MRA
had been an underutilized program that had been designed to prevent evic-
tion and foreclosure as a result of a disaster. Because of its underutilization