Page 104 - Critical and Cultural Theory

SUBJECTIVITY
famous dictum - 'I think, therefore I am' - encapsulates this idea:
the T is an autonomous subject which, in being conscious of its
ability to think, is automatically conscious of its existence. The
term subject does not always refer to an individual being or mind.
In the philosophical tradition of Idealism, for instance, it often
indicates the universal T or 'Self that brings reality into existence
by perceiving and conceptualizing it. 1 In both Descartes's system
and Idealism, with obvious differences, subjectivity is thus asso-
ciated with human powers - perception, reasoning, free agency.
These approaches have been drastically challenged by anti-Ration-
alist and anti-Idealist positions that reject the notion of the subject
as an autonomous consciousness, and stress instead the deter-
mined character of subjectivity. Especially important, in this
respect, are the writings of Soren Kierkegaard, Arthur Schopen-
hauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.
Kierkegaard (1813-55) rejects both Rationalist and Idealist
conceptions of the subject as a self-governing consciousness. He
sees no evidence for the existence of a free thinking substance of
the kind posited by Descartes. Neither does he subscribe to the
Idealist notion of the individual subject as a manifestation of a
universal principle supposed to endow each being with a unique
identity and to validate its existence as a component of a total
pattern of things. In fact, Kierkegaard's subject is a vulnerable
and insecure creature, compelled to define and redefine itself
endlessly through actions and decisions whose validity can be
rescinded anytime. Inaugurating Existentialism, 2 Kierkegaard
maintains that any attempt on the subject's part to assert itself
will only force it to recognize its absurdity and flimsiness in the
face of God's absolute infinity (Kierkegaard 1974).
Schopenhauer (1788-1860) likewise argues that the subject is
neither free nor able to achieve objective knowledge. Knowledge is
based on mere facades and the subject itself is knowable only in
terms of its appearance, as a physical body and as muscular
activity. Beside these physical dimensions, what defines subjectivity
is the will: a blind, unconscious, and indomitable will-to-live. It is
through the concept of the will that Schopenhauer denies most

'•^"This approach is examined in Part I, Chapter 1, 'Meaning' and in Part III,
Chapter 2, 'The Aesthetic'.
2 «*~See Part I, Chapter 5, 'Reading'.

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