Page 70 - Cultural Studies Volume 11
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64 CULTURAL STUDIES

            Their  popularity  as  feminists  is  in  part  due  to  their  use  of  popular  generic
            conventions.
              A bizarre situation arises, then, in which academic (cultural studies) feminism
            leads  the  way  in  displaying  a  sympathetic  and  perceptive  approach  to  popular
            culture,  yet  reserves  an  often  unacknowledged  antipathy  towards  popular
            feminism  for  its  attraction  to  the  popular  charms  of  conspiracy  theory.
            Conversely,  popular  feminists  such  as  Wolf  and  Faludi  repudiate  the  term
            ‘conspiracy’  in  their  desire  to  be  taken  seriously,  even  as  they  succumb  to  the
            attractions  of  personification  and  usher  in  a  barely  disguised  version  of  the
            conspiracy theory of mass culture. In this way, conspiracy becomes not so much
            the indication of a pre-given division between the popular and the scholarly, but
            the  site  and  the  very  structure  of  a  series  of  shifting  exclusions,  silences  and
            moments  of  rhetorical  crisis  through  which  a  division  between  a  vulgar  and  a
            sophisticated feminism is effected.

                                      Cultural dupes

            The  language  of  conspiracy  has  produced  divisions  and  exclusions  not  just
            between  academic  and  popular  feminism,  but  also  within  popular  feminist
            writings.  Quite  simply,  it  seems  that  it  is  always  other  women  who  are
            brainwashed. This sense of superiority—of having transcended the historical and
            intellectual  forces  in  which  others  are  still  immured—manifests  itself  in  the
            contradictory positionings effected by the pronoun ‘we’. The use of a collective
            ‘we’ in feminist writing answers an understandable desire to assert a solidarity,
            to forge a sisterhood to oppose patriarchy. Yet, conversely, the use of the first-
            person plural produces an implicit polarization between those who are subjected
            to  the  conspiracy  to  brainwash  women,  and  those  who  are  strong  and  wise
            subjects, able to recognize, criticize and even to transcend it. As we have seen,
            Friedan  mainly  discusses  the  brainwashing  of  American  women  in  the  third-
            person plural, giving the impression that—as she openly admits—once she was
            brainwashed  by  the  feminine  mystique,  but  now  she  has  escaped  the
            conditioning.  Occasionally, however,  she  does  use  the  first-person  plural.  For
            example: ‘there were many needs, at this particular time in America, that made
            us  pushovers  for  the  mystique:  needs  so  compelling  that  we  suspended  critical
            thought’ (1992:160, emphasis added). Friedan’s momentary alignment with the
            duped majority sits uneasily with her self-promotion as the heroic lone detective
            who has managed to uncover the secret conspiracy.
              By  the  time  of  The  Beauty  Myth,  the  problem  of  the  collective  pronoun  has
            become  pervasive.  Sentence  after  sentence  of  Wolf’s  prose  enacts  a  basic  but
            contradictory  division  between  those  who  are  duped  and  those  who  are  in  the
            know. Usually in the first half of the sentence she quotes a fact or figure about
            the oppression of women, phrasing it in the objective thirdperson plural, only in
            the second half to effect an identification with that oppression through her use of
            the  collective  pronoun.  Sometimes  this  has  a  disconcerting  poignancy,
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