Page 119 - Cultural Studies and Political Economy
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108 Chapter Three
The first poststructuralist postulate is that there is no objective reality; there
are only interpretations. Accordingly, poststructuralism maintains, one should
not seek facts, merely discuss; not quest for understanding, merely persuade
and interpret; not judge or assess because one cannot really know. Obviously,
however, one cannot ameliorate lived conditions if it is impossible to tran-
scend subjectivity. If in principle interpretation trumps facts and circum-
stances, and if one opinion or one interpretation is in principle never any bet-
ter or worse than any other, individualist pursuits efface all concern for the
social and the communal.
The second axiom (to be discussed more fully in chapter 8) is that there is
now a rupture between language and material reality. We are trapped within
language, it is contended, and hence can know nothing of our material condi-
tions. Since we can know nothing of the material world, it would follow, we
cannot pursue social justice, except perhaps through “language-ing” and lin-
guistic “articulations.”
Third, there is the proposition (again documented in chapter 8) that in the
contemporary (postmodern) era of simulacra and articulations, both cause
and effect (causation) and rationality (logic) are anachronistic baggage. But,
if an effect has no cause or causes, there can be no (efficacious) policies,
which is again tantamount to dismissing the pursuit of social justice, which is
the heart of political economy. And if rationality (logic) is dead, so too must
be all scholarship such as political economy which is based on reason.
RECONCILIATION OR DIVORCE?
In the form of a question, Grossberg briefly set out the terms whereby he
could countenance closer collaboration with political economy. “The ques-
tion,” he wrote, “is whether it is possible to have a political economy theo-
rized around articulation rather than strict determination or necessity.” 33
(Note that Grossberg chose not to say, “theorized around interpretation rather
than truth or authenticity,” although that would have also represented his po-
sition equally well.) Substantial space has been afforded in this book to cri-
tiquing charges of “strict determinisms and necessities” in political economy,
so it would be redundant to cover that ground again. It warrants another men-
tion, though, that political economy does presume “soft determinisms,”
which means that life is not totally random, that there are patterns that can be
detected, areas that can be researched, findings attained, and conclusions
drawn.
Articulation, however, merits some further attention, an interesting ques-
tion being the extent to which it might correspond to, or be consistent with,