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124                        Chapter Four

             When “minimal effects”—belied by methodological problems, conflicting
           evidence (as provided by Hovland, Lasswell, Gerbner, and many others), and
           its overdrawn conclusions—finally waned as mainstream doctrine by the late
           1960s, another theory, namely  uses and gratifications, promptly took its
           place. Actually, audience uses and gratifications had been studied by Lazars-
           feld in the 1940s as a way of helping clients garner larger audiences. In the
           1960s, though, it blossomed from being merely a market research tool into
           becoming “one of the most popular theories of mass communication.” 40
           Simpson attributed this remarkable renewal and ascendance to a 1959 paper
           by RAND Corporation researcher W. Phillips Davison. 41  In any event, by
           1968, with the publication of Television in Politics: Its Uses and Influences by
           Blumler and McQuail, uses and gratifications were mainstream.
             Unlike the law of minimum effects, uses and gratifications theory did not
           deny the possibility of profound impacts of media on audiences. What it as-
           serted, rather, was that those consequences are anticipated and actively sought
                                                                 42
           out by audiences in light of their preexisting needs and desires. As formu-
           lated by its innovators, uses and gratifications can include: attaining informa-
           tion, gaining a sense of personal identity (as through role modeling), facili-
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           tating social interaction, and being entertained. Uses and gratifications like
           these, however, for a political economist, raise a host of serious questions: for
           instance, what types of information are and are not made available to curious
           audiences and by whom—issues addressed with telling results by such mar-
                                                                 44
           ginalized researchers as Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. Explosive
           questions like these, however, cannot even be thought if and when the re-
           search paradigm is that of audience “uses and gratifications.”
             By the 1980s, uses and gratifications, too, had waned in influence, but only
           to be replaced by yet another media power-denying doctrine, namely Stanley
           Fish’s active reader. As Paul Cobley summarizes:

             For [Stanley] Fish, the reader supplies everything; this is because there can be
             nothing that precedes interpretation. As soon as human beings apprehend an
             item in the world they have already embarked on a process of interpreting it.
             There can be no ‘given’ as such. 45
             As noted in chapter 3 and again in chapter 8, the “active audience” and the
           primacy of interpretation form a cornerstone of poststructuralist positions.
           The flip side of the doctrine of the active reader/active audience, of course, is
           denying the power of message senders, whose role is reduced, in effect, to
           compiling Rorschach tests for audiences to interpret as they will. Fish’s posi-
           tion, as Anthony Easthope summarizes, is “resoundingly conservative.” 46
             Again, however, real world events and practices belie mainstream postur-
           ings. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was one notable instance of the triumph
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