Page 231 - Cultural Theory and Popular Culture an Introduction
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                                                                    A paradigm crisis in cultural studies?  215

                      the glow of its absolute moral and aesthetic value; students assume the role of passive
                      consumers of an already constituted knowledge – fixed, formulated and administered
                      by the professorial guardians of the flame. The refusal to privilege aesthetic judgement
                      is not in my opinion a crisis, but a welcome recognition that there are other, sometimes
                      far more interesting, questions to be asked (see Chapter 9). What is aesthetically ‘good’
                      and  what  is  aesthetically  ‘bad’  changes  and  changes  again  in  context  after  context.
                      Moreover, what is ‘good’ aesthetically may be ‘bad’ in terms of politics; what is ‘bad’
                      aesthetically may be ‘good’ politically. Rather than being trapped by a hopeless quest
                      for  abstract  certainty,  it  is  much  more  productive  to  recognize  that  it  is  only  in
                      grounded contexts that these questions can be really answered. But more than this, cul-
                      tural  studies  should  be  little  concerned  with  making  speculative  value  judgements
                      about the inherent qualities of commodities and focus its time instead on what people
                      do with them, make from them, etc., in the constraining and enabling structures of
                      everyday life. These are what I mean by more interesting questions. Those who insist
                      on a return to absolute standards are saying little more than that it is too confusing
                      now: I want back my easy and unquestioned authority to tell ordinary people what it
                      is worth and how it is done.

                          That ordinary people use the symbolic resources available to them under present
                          conditions for meaningful activity is both manifest and endlessly elaborated upon
                          by new revisionism. Thus emancipatory projects to liberate people from their alleged
                          entrapment, whether they know they are entrapped or not, are called into question
                          by  this  fundamental  insight.  Economic  exploitation,  racism,  gender  and  sexual
                          oppression, to name but a few, exist, but the exploited, estranged and oppressed
                          cope, and, furthermore, if such writers as John Fiske and Paul Willis are to be believed,
                          they cope very well indeed, making valid sense of the world and obtaining grateful
                          pleasure from what they receive. Apparently, there is so much action in the micro-
                          politics of everyday life that the Utopian promises of a better future, which were
                          once so enticing for critics of popular culture, have lost all credibility (171).

                        Most of this is simply untrue. Even Fiske (his prime example) does not celebrate an
                      achieved utopia, but the active struggle of men and women to make sense of and make
                      space in a world structured around exploitation and oppression. McGuigan seems to
                      be saying that pleasure (and its identification and celebration) is in some fundamental
                      sense  counter-revolutionary.  The  duty  and  historical  destiny  of  ordinary  men  and
                      women is to suffer and be still, until moral leftists reveal what is to be enjoyed on the
                      glorious morning of the long day after the Revolution. Feminists unwilling to lie back
                      and think about the economic base exposed the rhetorical vacuousness of this kind of
                      thinking long ago. It simply is not the case that claims that audiences produce mean-
                      ing are in some profound sense a denial of the need for political change. We can celeb-
                      rate  symbolic  resistance  without  abandoning  our  commitment  to  radical  politics.
                      This is in effect the core of Ang’s point (see Chapter 7). Presented in this way, political
                      economy seems to amount to little more than another (sometimes sophisticated) ver-
                      sion of the ‘ideology of mass culture’.
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