Page 248 - Cyberculture and New Media
P. 248

Seppo Kuivakari                    239
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                             one traces its examination, on this side of imitation and contagion, right back
                             to an appropriation of the other, who can only result from a community, from
                             an  already  given  being-with-the-Other.  Through  the  double  path  of
                             narcissistic  and  hysterical  identifications,  a  path  never  absolutely  reduced,
                             one does not end up with a concept, but with the formation, which endlessly
                             redoubles  and  undoes  itself,  of  a  constitution  of  identity  through  a  being-
                             with-the-Other  which  only  takes  place  in  the  negation  of  the  Other.  This
                             negation  is  also  an  appropriation,  but  the  one  who  appropriates  has  no
                             “proper”, he is not a subject. Consequently, if there  must  be a question of
                             origin, the latter takes place (or arrives) neither through a subject nor through
                             an other, nor through the Same nor through the Other (l’Autre) but through
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                             asociality,  or  through  an  altered  sociality.   This  is  not  only  a  modernist
                             rupture  in  the  transparency  of  the  visual  regime  –  Bolter  and  Grusin  say
                             hypermediacy,  the  “hold”  of  technology,  becomes  the  sum  of  all  the
                             unconventional  unusual,  and  in  some  sense  deviant  ways  of  looking:  it  is
                             multiple  and  deviant  in  its  suggestion  of  multiplicity,  a  multiplicity  of
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                             viewing positions and a multiplicity of relationships to the object in view  –
                             but a centuries old technique of the artist. Philosophically, we can understand
                             this not as inter-, but alteration.
                                     Within this, the identification process as such will not be finalized.
                             Or  fragmented,  as  the  myth  of  “modern”  in  the  evaluation  of  modernism
                             suggests. Instead, it will continue, infinitely.
                                     Now, with extensive use of desistant motifs in art, there might be a
                             certain deconstructive process happening that dis-erects the human from the
                             image –  simulation  from the emotion  machine, as ecological  media theory
                             supposes  –  of  ourselves:  an  unstructuring  of  being  and  its  relation  to  the
                             world.  Hypothetically,  we  can  understand  that  desistant  media  are
                             misappropriated tools and thereby produce, as we will see, the uncanniness
                             within (and of) mimesis.
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                                     To  “desist”  is,  in  Derrida’s  words,   to  correspond  to  a  kind  of
                             madness,  obsession  and  schiz,  siege  and  caesura,  double  bind  and
                             impossibility of reappropriation, hyperbology, ineluctable dis-identification.
                             What  interests  us  here  is  neither  the  subject  nor  the  author.  Nor  is  it  the
                             “other”, whatever one places under the term, of the subject of the author. It
                             would  be  rather  what  is  also  at  play  in  the  subject;  what,  in  the  subject,
                             “deserts”  the  subject  itself,  and  which,  prior  to  any  “self-possession”  (and
                             following  another  mode  than  that  of  dispossession),  is  the  dissolution,  the
                             defeat of the subject in the subject or as the subject. The (de)constitution of
                             the subject, or the loss of the subject is to conceive of the loss of what one
                             has never had, a kind of “originary” in a sense of “constitute” loss (of self).
                             Lacoue-Labarthe’s  way  of  parenthesizing  the  “de”  in  “(de)constitution”
                             signifies for Derrida that one must not hear it (any more than in the case of
                             desistance)  as  a  negativity  affecting  an  originary  and  positive  constitution.
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