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18         ‘Until Something Else’ – A Theoretical Introduction
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                             assertion  that  abstraction  “also  took  from  perception  to  purify”  implicates
                             Greenberg’s characterisation of modernism in Bruno Latour’s similar critique
                             of  modernity  as  largely  manifesting  through  a  practice  of  purification,  of
                             separation  of  “native”  from  “modern”  sensibility,  of  pure  from  impure,
                             whose  culminating  process  is  the  scientific  method,  a  methodological  holy
                             grail of sorts for Greenberg (See Latour, B., We Have Never Been Modern,
                             trans. Catherine Porter, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993.) .
                             5
                                Greenberg,  C.,  Art  and  Culture:  Critical  Essays,  Beacon  Press,  Boston,
                             1965.
                             6
                               This hybridism is for Latour, modernity’s second practice, a complement to
                             that of purification.
                             7
                               Greenberg, Art and Culture: Critical Essays,
                             8
                               It is the relevance of this organicity to modernism that Greenberg dismisses.
                             While  Picasso  and  Matisse  had  broken  with  nature,  the  work  of  Stieglitz,
                             Georgia  O’Keeffe,  Arthur  Dove,  and  Kandinsky,  rife  with  “mystical
                             overtones”, was for Greenberg a “repudiation of technics and rationalism”, a
                             metaphysical  “messianism”  that  Caroline  Jones  connects  to  multiplicity  of
                             charges: of Greenberg’s view of Stieglitz as an intellectually puerile dandy;
                             to Greenberg’s  view of O’Keeffe as “pseudo-modern”; and to Greenberg’s
                             inability to free the photograph from its indexicality (Cf. Jones, pp.145-175).
                             As  my  later  treatment  of  art  and  metaphysics  reveals,  these  biases  leave
                             Greenberg  outside  the  portals  of  cyberculture,  with  its  propensity  for
                             assimilation through layered recoding of historical culture’s many previously
                             unconnected manifestations.
                             9
                               “Once society has lost its myth-based community, it loses all the reference
                             points of truly common language until such time as the divisions within the
                             inactive community can be overcome by the inauguration of a real historical
                             community. When art, which was the common language of social inaction,
                             develops into independent art in the modern sense, emerging from its original
                             religious universe and becoming individual production of separate works, it
                             too becomes subject to the movement governing the history of all separate
                             culture. Its declaration of independence is the beginning of its end”. Debord,
                             G.,  The  Society  of  the  Spectacle,  trans.  Donald  Nicholson-Smith,  Zone
                             Books, Cambridge, Mass., 1967/1995.§ 186.
                             10
                                Nor is this merely postmodern hindsight. Documenting Bergson’s rejection
                             of the conceptual method in favour of the flux-like immediacy of experience,
                             a 1912 review of the first English translation of Time and Free Will, makes
                             clear  that  the  basis  for  just  such  an  essentialist  reading  of  Stieglitz  was
                             available  in  his  own  day.  Bergson’s  “sympathetic  insight”  as  fuel  for  the
                             intuitive grasp crucial to a Stieglitz photograph is contrasted with the kind of
                             formal/categorical reasoning that disrupts the captured phenomenon so that
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