Page 371 - Discrimination at Work The Psychological and Organizational Bases

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(Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 1987). One way of viewing affirmative
action is that it is a way of compensating for discriminatory practices and
structures that have, either intentionally or unintentionally, kept groups of
people out of jobs and careers (Crosby, 1994). Clearly, affirmative action is
intended to be conscious, and it is the "consciousness" of it that contributes
to its lack of popularity. Justice perspectives (Greenberg, 1987; Nacoste,
1987, 1994) and basic notions of the undesirability of consciously sex- or
race-based categorizations (Clayton, 1996) suggest some of the major rea­
sons why affirmative action is viewed negatively in our society. Racism
and sexism have also been linked to negative attitudes about affirmative
action, in addition to contributing to the underlying problem of discrim­
ination itself (Bobo & Kleugel, 1993; Gaertner et al., 1999; Jacobson, 1985;
Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995).
Importantly, affirmative action has unconscious aspects to it. First, it can
be viewed as an organizational or societal corrective for discrimination that
is automatic and unconscious. Media and political attention focuses on the
conscious aspects of affirmative action without emphasizing the continu­
ing unconscious or automatic discrimination that occurs in American soci­
ety. Affirmative action, although legally viewed as a remedy for intentional
discrimination, serves a bigger social purpose of focusing on fair outcomes
in a society in which intentions are sometimes good but nonetheless result
in discriminatory treatment.
Second, however, the "conscious" attempt to benefit minority members
espoused by affirmative action programs is also infected with unconscious
bias, and this bias may not always work toward the benefit of the in­
tended recipients. A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision has clarified an
important role for subjectivity in valid affirmative action plans; the guide­
lines provided by the Court will be important in both the employment
and educational arenas. In Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), the Court rejected an
undergraduate admissions plan at the University of Michigan because it
provided a fixed number of points for each disadvantaged minority group
applicant's application score. On the same day, the Court approved the af­
firmative action plan designed by the University of Michigan Law School,
which allowed admissions decisions to be based on subjective, individu­
alized, "plus-factor" considerations (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).
Both cases involved challenges under the Constitution. Of great impor­
tance, the Court allowed diversity to serve as a compelling state reason for
taking race into account in college admissions decisions. The difference in
the cases is based on the manner in which race can be taken into account.
Although the former plan (Gratz) did not set aside any seats for minor­
ity members and so was not viewed as a quota, it nonetheless was con­
sidered too rigid by a majority of the Justices to meet the individualized
consideration requirement that is the foundation of discrimination law. In