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                                           PAETZOLD
               TABLE 14.1
 Disparate Impact With Net Benefits to the Protected Class
                      Word-of-Mouth Recruiting
                     Pass             Don't Pass
   Pass              Black 49         Black 1
                     White 70         White 10
   Tests
   Don't Pass        Black 0          Black 50
                     White 0          White 20
 Adapted from Paetzold, R. L., & Willborn, S. L. (1996). Deconstructing
 disparate impact: A view of the model through new lenses. North Carolina
 Law Review, 74,325-399.
 persons, thus leading to a selection ratio of .70 (which is less than .80).
 Thus, an adverse impact exists on Black persons, and the one Black person
 who didn't "pass" through the word-of-mouth recruiting would be enti­
 tled to relief. This is true even though the net affect of the word-of-mouth
 recruiting operates to favor Black people as a group. In other words, only
 one of 100 Black persons is actually adversely affected by the selection
 mechanism, compared to 10 of 100 White persons. In fact, the word-of-
 mouth recruiting mechanism increases the proportion of Black persons
 in the pool available for hire from .385 to .412 vis-a-vis White persons
 (i.e., without the requirement, 50 Black and 80 White persons pass and are
 available for hire, but with the requirement, 49 Black and 70 White per­
 sons pass and are available for hire). Thus, as a group Black people should
 prefer that the word-of-mouth recruiting be left in place, but the one Black
 person who is disadvantaged would be motivated to bring (and could
 win, if no business necessity exists) a disparate impact lawsuit (Paetzold
 & Willborn, 1996, p. 362). The example demonstrates the individual nature
 of the disparate impact model, which is counter to traditional I/O or HR
 understanding of the model, e.g., "[D]isparate impact discrimination oc­
 curs when an apparently neutral employment practice disproportionately
 excludes a protected group from employment opportunities" (DeNisi & Grif­
 fin, 2001, p. 74, emphasis added); "[A]dverse impact... occurs when the
 same standard is applied to all applicants or employees, but that standard
 affects a protected class more negatively (adversely)" (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, &
 Cardy 1998, p. 91, emphasis added). It is certain members of a group who
 may suffer an adverse impact; the group may not suffer at all.
 This line of argument suggests that employers should think carefully
 about the potential redundancy of their employment screens—not just in
 terms of their validity for predicting performance (the typical I/O or HR
 concern), but also in terms of their actual impact. An in-basket exercise,
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