Page 164 - Forensic Structural Engineering Handbook

STANDARD OF CARE 4.13

face. Well after the building was completed and occupied, the design engineer reviewed the
frame for adequacy against “cross-corner” winds. He found that based on that loading
assumption, the building had a small but unacceptable probability of collapse. Work to
strengthen the building was carried out. It was widely agreed that the structural engineer’s
performance was not beneath the standard of care. That is, the structural engineer exercised
an acceptable degree of care, diligence, and integrity, and therefore the error was not due
to professional negligence.
This situation illustrates the importance of a rapid response to the discovery of error, and
the fact that even nonnegligent errors can be dangerous and very expensive to correct.

Lighting Tower Collapse
Competent engineering practice includes timely communication of information. A tragic
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construction failure resulted in significant liability on the part of an engineer. The SER
for the Olympic Stadium in Atlanta, Georgia, discovered an error in his design of a portion
of a steel light tower to be built as part of the stadium. He notified his client, the architect
for the stadium, and designed a repair for the error. The SER was not aware of the progress
of construction, and did not consider the error and the repair an emergency. Unbeknownst
to the SER, construction had indeed progressed to the point that the light tower was being
erected 10 days after the SER informed the architect of the error and the need for repair.
The repairs had not been carried out by that time. During erection, the light tower collapsed
as a result of the design error, killing one iron worker and injuring another.
The SER’s engineering registration was suspended for 3 years by the Georgia Board of
Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, and the SER was sued for
wrongful death. The professional negligence alleged by the plaintiffs was the SER’s fail-
ure to “explicitly indicate to the project manager (the architect) that emergency action was
required.” The error in the design was not negligent, but the lack of urgency in the SER’s
response to uncovering the error was.
The lack of urgency only became significant because the SER was unaware of the
progress of the construction. Coordination or communication which should have occurred
in order for the SER to have been aware of the progress of construction was apparently
absent. Despite the possibility the SER may have had nothing to do with this absence of
coordination or communication, the SER was on the hook. In this case, the engineer’s lia-
bility apparently existed at least partially because of the failure of others to keep him
informed. This is an important lesson for practicing engineers; it is important that informa-
tion flows in a timely manner to all appropriate parties.

Bridge Collapse and the Duty to Warn
Another duty of an engineer is the duty to warn. California Attorney General’s Opinion
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Number 85-208 (1985) states that a registered engineer hired to investigate the integrity
of a building has a duty to warn the building’s occupants if the engineer determines they
face an imminent risk of serious injury due to a hazard the engineer observes. This opinion
requires the engineer to warn the occupants even though the building owner client of the
engineer requires confidentiality on the part of the engineer.
The extent of the duty to warn varies with location and circumstance, and the standard
of care in one locality may not be the standard of care in another. The following case study
is an example of this fact.
A 77-year-old county-owned suspension bridge for pedestrian traffic, nicknamed
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Swinging Bridge, collapsed into the Little Red River in Arkansas in 1989. Forty people