Page 103 - Foundations of Cognitive Psychology : Core Readings

104 John R. Searle

remember that in principle the man can internalize the formal structure of the
water pipes and do all the ‘‘neuron firings’’ in his imagination. The problem
with the brain simulator is that it is simulating the wrong things about the
brain. As long as it simulates only the formal structure of the sequence of neu-
ron firings at the synapses, it won’t have simulated what matters about the
brain, namely its causal properties, its ability to produce intentional states. And
that the formal properties are not sufficient for the causal properties is shown
by the water pipe example: we can have all the formal properties carved off
from the relevant neurobiological causal properties.

5.4 The Combination Reply (Berkeley and Stanford)
‘‘While each of the previous three replies might not be completely convincing
by itself as a refutation of the Chinese room counterexample, if you take all
three together they are collectively much more convincing and even decisive.
Imagine a robot with a brain-shaped computer lodged in its cranial cavity,
imagine the computer programmed with all the synapses of a human brain,
imagine the whole behavior of the robot is indistinguishable from human
behavior, and now think of the whole thing as a unified system and not just as
a computer with inputs and outputs. Surely in such a case we would have to
ascribe intentionality to the system.’’
I entirely agree that in such a case we would find it rational and indeed irre-
sistible to accept the hypothesis that the robot had intentionality, as long as we
knew nothing more about it. Indeed, besides appearance and behavior, the
other elements of the combination are really irrelevant. If we could build a
robot whose behavior was indistinguishable over a large range from human
behavior, we would attribute intentionality to it, pending some reason not to.
We wouldn’t need to know in advance that its computer brain was a formal
analogue of the human brain.
But I really don’t see that this is any help to the claims of strong AI; and
here’s why: According to strong AI, instantiating a formal program with the
right input and output is a sufficient condition of, indeed is constitutive of,
intentionality. As Newell (1979) puts it, the essence of the mental is the opera-
tion of a physical symbol system. But the attributions of intentionality that we
make to the robot in this example have nothing to do with formal programs.
They are simply based on the assumption that if the robot looks and behaves
sufficiently like us, then we would suppose, until proven otherwise, that it
must have mental states like ours that cause and are expressed by its behavior
and it must have an inner mechanism capable of producing such mental states.
If we knew independently how to account for its behavior without such
assumptions we would not attribute intentionality to it, especially if we knew it
had a formal program. And this is precisely the point of my earlier reply to the
objection in section 5.2.
Suppose we knew that the robot’s behavior was entirely accounted for by
the fact that a man inside it was receiving uninterpreted formal symbols from
the robot’s sensory receptors and sending out uninterpreted formal symbols to
its motor mechanisms, and the man was doing this symbol manipulation in