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Safety of Fusion Reactors  Chapter | 14    421



               TABLE 14.4 Summary of Releases for Hypothetical Events
                                                 % of the No-evacuation threshold
                                                      Weather conditions
               Event                             Average         Conservative
               Loss of coolant from cooling systems   <1         <20
               accompanied by failure of all plasma
               heating system windows (the ‘wet bypass’)
               Loss of two barriers at the vacuum chamber   <1   <10
               entrance (the ‘dry bypass’)
               Failure of two of the tritium plant   ∼1          15
               confinement barriers
               Decay heat from IVC under loss of electric   <1   <1
               power supply
               Ex-vessel/in-vessel loss of coolant associated   <1  <1
               with failure of the plasma discharge
               suppression system
               Magnetic field energy release     <1              <1


             would lead to environmental releases of up to 15 g tritium (as oxide) and 11 g of
             dust, which is less than 20% of the no-evacuation threshold.
                The consequences of natural and human-induced disasters have also been an-
             alysed. Assessments have been made for the SL-2 class earthquake (assumed to
             have a peak ground acceleration of 0.2 g horizontal and vertical with a return pe-
             riod of 10,000 years), a crash of a jet aircraft with around 4000 L of fuel in tanks
             and a Cessna type propeller-driven aeroplane. They showed that the required
             primary safety function is performed, keeping releases below prescribed limits.

             14.4.4  Conclusions
             The general conclusion from the preceding discussion is that the ITER is ade-
             quately designed in terms of safety of the population and the environment and is
             not critically reliant on the functioning of safety systems. This is proved by re-
             cent refined calculations, which suggest that radioactive effluents will be lower
             than those assessed earlier. It is supported by parametric analyses.
                Consequently, the guaranteed radiation safety concept underlying the ITER
             design can be viewed as a basic one. It is premised on the following:
             l  Technical solutions that have long been tested in different power engineer-
                ing applications. They include the use of water as a coolant and stainless
                steel as the principal structural material for the vacuum vessel and the in-
                vessel components.
             l  Intrinsic self-protection capacity.
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