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CONNECTING WITH PEOPLE BEYOND WORDS
CHAPTER 9
as informative. He was the same with the Allies, especially Britain. Having
seen the folly of disunity among the Allies during World War I, he argued
forcefully for a unified command during World War II. He wanted an Ameri-
can commander, but he was willing to put British generals into leadership
positions, or even to put an American officer in a subordinate position to a
23
British officer as a means of demonstrating a willingness to cooperate.
Marshall drew a distinct line between the military and politics. Throughout
the war, by virtue of his position, he was required to testify before Congress.
Even though the process was time-consuming and took him away from his mil-
itary duties, he prepared himself and underwent the rigor of testifying. He also
ordered full cooperation with the Truman committee’s investigation of military
purchasing, rather than stonewalling. The result was twofold: First, Truman’s
committee uncovered waste and sometimes fraud and in the process ended up
saving the nation billions of dollars, and second, he and Truman had the oppor-
tunity to assess each other; this paved the way for greater understanding when
Truman was thrust into the presidency after Roosevelt’s death. 24
MILITARY VERSUS POLITICAL
Marshall also recused himself from the summits among heads of state that
took place periodically throughout the war. He did not think it was wise for a
military man to influence political outcomes. At the same time, Marshall was
not a political neophyte. Although there were suggestions that he run for
office, even for the presidency, he always declined. He knew how Washington
worked, and he prided himself on his reputation for being honest and without
25
guile. Periodically, he had to undergo what must have been humiliating
examinations—for example, in late 1945 during the investigation of the lack
of preparedness at Pearl Harbor, and in the early 1950s when he was wrongly
accused by the red-baiting McCarthyites of undermining America’s resistance
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to communist forces, particularly in Asia. With this latter charge, scurrilous
though it was, Marshall took the high road, refusing to dignify McCarthy’s
charges with a rebuttal. His reply: “If I have to explain at this point that I am
not a traitor to the United States, I hardly think it’s worth it.” 27
The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan was one that Marshall did
not want to make. He fully endorsed the development of the bomb and in fact
was the chief overseer of the project: General Lesley Groves reported to him.
Marshall understood that the decision to drop it was one that would have pro-
found moral consequences, and for that reason he deemed its use not a mili-
tary decision, but one for the government to make. However, Marshall
endorsed the use of the atomic bomb as a means of shortening the war and
ultimately saving the lives of both the American soldiers and the Japanese
civilians and soldiers who would be killed if Japan were invaded. 28