Page 222 - Law and the Media

Protection of Journalistic Sources
11.2 Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981
11.2.1 General principles

Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (‘the CCA’) provides:

No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of
court for refusing to disclose the source of information contained in a publication
for which he is responsible, unless it is established to the satisfaction of the court
that it is necessary in the interests of justice or national security, or for the
prevention of disorder or crime.

Section 10 of the CCA recognizes the need for protection of journalists’ sources in a free and
democratic society, and creates a presumption in favour of journalists who wish to protect
their sources. However, the presumption is subject to four exceptions where disclosure of the
source of information will be deemed to be necessary:

1. In the interests of justice
2. In the interests of national security
3. For the prevention of disorder, or
4. For the prevention of crime.

11.2.2 In the interests of justice
The meaning of ‘in the interests of justice’ was explained to some extent by X Ltd v Morgan-
Grampian (Publishers) Ltd (1991). William Goodwin, a journalist working for a trade
magazine called The Engineer, had obtained highly confidential information from a missing
copy of the claimant’s corporate business plan. Goodwin’s telephone calls to the company’s
offices prior to publication alerted the company to the fact that he was in possession of
information that must have come from the missing document. The claimant obtained an
injunction restraining publication of the confidential material, and Goodwin was ordered to
hand over his notes so that the person who stole the business plan could be identified.

On appeal, the House of Lords ruled that ‘in the interests of justice’ should be given a wide
meaning and need not necessarily be confined to situations where court proceedings were
already in existence or about to be commenced. The phrase should be construed so that:

. . . persons should be enabled to exercise important legal rights and to protect
themselves from serious legal wrongs whether or not resort to legal proceedings in
a court of law will be necessary to protect these objectives. Thus, to take an
example, if an employer of a large staff is suffering grave damage from the
activities of an unidentified disloyal servant, it is undoubtedly in the interests of
justice that he should be able to identify him in order to terminate his contract of
employment, notwithstanding that no legal proceedings may be necessary to
achieve this end.
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