Page 45 - Law and the Media

Law and the Media
In a demonstration of the importance modern society places on appearance, the case of
Berkoff v Burchill (1996) held that calling someone ‘horrendously ugly’ was defamatory
because it might expose that person to ridicule.

1.2.7 The construction and meaning of words

It has long been recognized that the strict rules of construction that may be appropriate for
ascertaining the meaning of words in other areas of the law will not do for the purposes of
libel. The objective approach is used when construing the meaning of the statement. The
court must consider how the statement would be understood by the ordinary, reasonable
person, not how it is understood by the defendant.

Where there are conflicting interpretations of the defamatory statement, the court must
determine just one ‘correct’ meaning. Although the meaning intended by the defendant is
irrelevant, an ‘innocent’ defendant can use the ‘offer of amends’ procedure (see paragraph
1.3.4 below).

It is recognized that a seemingly innocent statement can convey a defamatory meaning to
those who have knowledge of certain facts or circumstances that are extraneous to the
offending statement. The law of libel therefore recognizes two distinct types of meaning: the
natural and ordinary meaning, and the meaning by innuendo.

Natural and ordinary meaning
The ‘natural and ordinary meaning’ includes both the literal meaning and any obvious
inference that could be taken from the statement. It is a question of law to be determined by
a judge whether the statement is capable of bearing a particular defamatory meaning. It is a
question of fact to be decided by the jury what the ordinary, reasonable person would
understand the statement to actually mean.

The ordinary, reasonable person is not unduly suspicious, but can read between the lines
(Lewis v Daily Telegraph (1964)) and is entitled to assume that there is ‘no smoke without
fire’. He will be taken to have a reasonable knowledge of contemporary slang and to be
aware that words such as ‘rip-off’ and ‘tart’ can have meanings that are defamatory today.
He will be expected to consider the statement complained of in the context of the whole
publication (Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd (1995)) rather than in isolation, and
to attach particular significance to a story appearing under bold headlines on the front page
of a newspaper. In the same way that the meaning actually intended by the defendant is
irrelevant, the actual interpretation placed upon the statement by the person who reads it is
also irrelevant. As a result readership surveys, evidence by actual recipients such as readers
or viewers as to their understanding cannot be adduced by either the claimant or the
defendant. It is the effect on the ordinary, reasonable person that is relevant.

Defamatory meaning can also be extracted from the manner and sense in which the statement
is published. It follows that the publication of rumours and denials can be extremely
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