Page 182 - Literacy in the New Media Age
P. 182

AN AGENDA FOR FURTHER THINKING 171

            writing to others, this is a crucial question. Are there forms of imagination which
            will  be  less  prominent,  less  usual,  less  habituated?  And  if  so,  what  should  our
            response  be  to  this  possibility?  This  is,  however,  quite  a  different  approach  to
            one  that  bemoans  the  withering  away  of  imagination  as  an  already  decided,  a
            foregone, event.
              If  we  take  seriously  the  goal  of  facility  in  design  as  the  new  essential
            pedagogic  aim  in  communication,  then  the  work  and  the  place  of  imagination
            will in any case be entirely different to what it has been so far. It will extend to
            semiotic  work  involving  the  entirely  ordinary,  the  everyday,  and  the  banal.
            Competent  performance  in  relation  to  one  mode  as  hitherto  envisaged,  with
            imagination reserved for interpretation involving specially valued texts or, more
            rare  still,  the  making  of  such  texts,  will  be  replaced  by  the  much  more
            demanding  tasks  precisely  of  selection,  arrangement  and  transformation,
            involving many modes, in always new environments, with their always changing
            demands.


                               Modes, bodies and dispositions
            In all this, the questions around gains and losses are entirely in the foreground.
            Forms of imagination are inseparable from the material characteristics of modes,
            from their shaping in a society’s history, and from their consequent interaction
            with the sensoriness, the sensuousness, of our bodies. Introducing a concern with
            materiality and the senses into representation brings the long-standing separation
            in  Western  thinking  of  mind  and  body  into  severe  question,  and  therefore
            challenges  the  reification  and  consequent  separation  of  cognition,  affect  and
            emotion. It becomes untenable to assume that cognition is separable from affect;
            all representation is always affective, while it is also always cognitive. In fact,
            the existence of these two terms is shown to be a problem. Even now, in writing
            this,  I  am  tempted  and  really  forced  to  say  –  because  the  lexical  and  syntactic
            resources  of  written  English  are  organised  in  this  way  –  that  representation  is
            always  both  cognitive  and  affective,  and  I  am  forced  into  using  both  terms,  as
            distinct, discrete, as seemingly real. There is a need not just for rethinking, but for
            re-lexicalising, the language.
              Once this has been achieved – it has not, so far – we can begin to look in a
            fuller sense at the interrelations of modes and human social dispositions. What is
            the  effect  on  dispositions  of  the  dominant  use  of  the  visual  rather  than  of  the
            oral, of the visual-written rather than the oral-spoken? Not just in terms of effects
            on  memory,  but  in  terms  of  deeper  bodily  dispositions?  What  would  human
            dispositions be like if we were to rely much more on actional modes? Or on the
            visual? These questions have complex and multiple answers. As I suggested in
            earlier  chapters,  the  language  modes  dispose  us  towards  seeing  the  world  in
            terms of temporality and sequence, and in doing so they tend to make us see the
            world in causal relations. This is more so in languages such as English because it
            is  combined  with  lexicalisations  of  actions  on  the  one  hand  and,  on  the  other,
   177   178   179   180   181   182   183   184   185   186   187