Page 115 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

Railing Iraqi Resistance 105

violent conflicts in Iraq. In the Washington Post, Jackie Spinner argued that, in
2004, "Life became worse for large numbers of Iraqis. . . . Suicide car bomb-
ings, gun battles, kidnappings, beheadings and assassinations killed thousands of
people, sometimes more than a hundred in a single day."" Notice Iraqi hardship
increases only as a result of the actions of those resisting the U.S., not the U.S.
itself. The New York Times purveys one of the more subtle expressions of frus-
tration with the attacks on the U.S.; in one example, reporter Robert Worth ad-
dresses the American attempt to fight for the "Hearts and Minds" of Fallujans in
opposition to the "propaganda that has helped fuel the insurgency throughout
~ra~."*~ Under such an assumption, propaganda is only deemed something in
which American enemies partake.
An image of American troops as a friend to the Iraqi people has generally
been constructed in the mainstream press. American soldiers are reported "pass-
ing out candy to children," engaging in productive reconstruction efforts, and
fighting a harmful "insurgency."27 The United States is not labeled as a hege-
monic or repressive power, but rather as a vital tool in promoting Iraqi prosper-
ity. It is here that one sees the most blatant convergence between government
propaganda and media propaganda. For example, former head of Iraq's Coali-
tion Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer I11 denounced resistance groups for
attempting "to shoot their way to power." Bremer explained: "they must be dealt
with, and they will be dealt ~ith."'~ The United States, conversely, is not con-
sidered a malicious force which is intent on "shooting its way to power" in Iraq,
as American leaders are framed as committed to establishing Iraqi sovereignty
and self-rule, despite plans for an indefinite occupation and a radical escalation
of violence on the part of the U.S. military.
Prominent media personalities have promoted many of the more blunt
stereotypes against Iraqi resistance groups. The late Peter Jennings, former head
anchor for ABC Nightly News, faulted "the violent men" in Iraq who have tried
to disrupt the election and the U.S. occupation.29 Such a label problematically
implies that the U.S., by definition, is not violent-r at least that its actions
should not be characterized as so-even in the midst a pacification campaign
often failing to distinguish between violent opposition and civilians. Parallel to
the sharp criticism of Jennings is that of Charles Krauthamrner, a neo-
conservative columnist for the Washington Post, who defends the war by claim-
ing that, "The United States is trying to win hearts and minds; the insurgents are
trying to destroy hearts and minds, along with the bodies that house them. They
have no program. They have no ideology."30 Krauthammer's prognosis-r
complete lack thereof--of the goals of Iraqi resistance groups, is symbolic of
other reports in the mass media that frame guerilla groups as lacking any coher-
ent ideology or master plan. This type of analysis, however, displays a certain
naivete in that it does not delve into the motivations for attacks on the U.S. A
probe of such motivations, however, is crucial in order to better understand what
type of opposition the U.S. faces in Iraq.
As is discussed later in this chapter, the various resistance in Iraq-violent
and non-violent-have often enunciated their own coherent sets of principles
espousing national independence in opposition to the foreign occupation. Even