Page 132 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

Chapter 5

The Rise of Militias and "Counterinsurgency"

In January of 2006, Iraqi police discovered the bodies of twelve men who were
executed and dumped into three separate areas of Baghdad's Shia suburb of
Shula. The executions were but a few of many that have occurred throughout
Iraq in the last few years as a result of the re-emergence of sectarian violence in
Iraq. In January of 2006, four Iraqi patrol officers of the Iraqi Interior Ministry
were also detained and arrested at an Iraqi Army checkpoint after it was found
out that they were planning on kidnapping and killing a Sunni man. These four
men were subsequently shown to be a part of an Iraqi death squad tied to the
Badr Organization, which is a part of SCIRI (the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq), which is a Shia-based, Iranian supported political party op-
erating in Iraq. As U.S. Major General Joseph Peterson explained of the four
officers: "They responded truthfully, telling the soldiers that they were taking
the Sunni man away to be shot dead."'14 Although this incident represented the
first "official" evidence of death squad operations, the use of such groups in
sectarian-driven executions and assassinations has been ongoing for years.
In January of 2005, Newsweek reported that the Bush administration was
considering the possibility of the use of mercenary forces, (often referred to as
death squads) throughout Iraq, in an attempt to counter the growth in resistance
groups, as well as suspected ~ym~athizers."~ This plan was dubbed the "Salva-
dor Option," as it was modeled after the past U.S. practice of supporting para-
military forces in El Salvador from the 1970s through the early 1990s. Accord-
ing to Newsweek, the "Pentagon proposal would send Special Forces teams to
advise, support and possibly train Iraqi squads, most likely hand-picked Kurdish
Peslunerga fighters and Shiite militiamen." Newsweek reported that these squads
would then target suspected "insurgents" and "insurgent sympathizers," much as
El Salvador's paramilitaries did, in order to create a general atmosphere of "fear
of aiding the insurgency," according to one military source involved in revealing
the Salvador Option. As the official explained, "The Sunni population is paying
no price for the support it is giving to the terrorists. . . from their point of view, it
is cost-free. We have to change that equation."'16
Claims throughout the mainstream press concerning these "counterinsur-
gency" units went something like this: the U.S. government will support
"counter-terrorist strike squads" (the language used by Newsweek) in order "to
target Sunni insurgents and their sympathizers."117 Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld denied the existence of the "Salvador Option," claiming that it is the
"responsibility of the commanders there and the coalition and the Iraqi govern-
ment to see that the Iraqis are trained up to provide security for that ~ountry.""~
In the case of El Salvador, the Reagan and Carter administrations provided
billions in funding to government forces and paramilitaries that targeted oppo-
nents of the government, violent and nonviolent. As with the U.S. war against
Iraqi resistance, the Salvadoran government also alleged that the use of
"counter-insurgency'' forces would be used only to destroy dangerous guerilla