Page 197 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

Doctrines of Media and State 187

the deaths in Iraq is unfeasible at a time when sectarian and occupation violence
are causing the country to spiral out of control.
The 1st Lancet study was also limited in that it only looked at the seventeen
months after the March 2003 invasion, and did not encompass any statistics for
the period including the last few months of 2004 and beyond. While the second
study did much to compensate for the earlier study's limited period, both studies
still failed to take into account any deaths that occurred after the 2003-2006
period. However, the Lancet reports still merit more extensive news coverage
than they received in that they met the standard medical and scientific methodo-
logical requirements for studies estimating death tolls in war zones. For this rea-
son alone they should have been a much larger focus throughout the media, and
should not have been dismissed or downplayed as "exaggerated" or "false"
based upon the negative political implications they posed for the Bush and Blair
administration's occupation of Iraq.
A more balanced standard for reporting the projected Iraqi death toll is
badly needed in the American media. The estimates President Bush cites for
Iraqi casualties (which are virtually identical to the more conservative estimates
of Iraq Body Count) were projected to be in the range of about 30,000 people
(prior to the release of the second Lancet report). Bush's use of the 30,000 figure
has been quoted more frequently and featured more often throughout the mass
media, as reporters generally reacted to this study with less skepticism than they
did the Lancet projects.31 Disregard for the Lancet reports, and the relative lack
of skepticism toward the Iraq Body Count estimates are important to address in
light of admissions from those involved with IBC who explain that their esti-
mates are limited in a number of ways. IBC admits that: "it is likely that many if
not most civilian casualties will go unreported by the media [sources in which
IBC relies] ... our own total is certain to be an underestimate of the true position,
because of gaps in reporting or recording."32

Moral Violence and Challenges to "Collateral Damage"

Attempts to create a moral distinction between the violence of the US. and that
of its enemies are seen throughout much of American media coverage of foreign
wars. This trend is acknowledged from time to time, although most often it is
not explicitly discussed. In one of the exceptions, George Will of the Washing-
ton Post expounded upon the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
violence when he asserted that, "the first task of the [U.S.] occupation [of Iraq]
remains the first task of government, to establish a monopoly on ~iolence.'"~
Many Americans see their country as a purveyor of moral violence, as opposed
to official enemies, which are said to use violence for pernicious purposes such
as greed and lust for power. The concept of limiting "collateral damage" fits
well within this system of thought, promoted by government officials, media,
and part of the American public. According to this theory, American enemies
such as the Iraqi "insurgents" are deemed terrorists because they actively target
civilians, whereas American forces, in attempting to "promote democracy," re-