Page 212 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

202 Chapter 8

over of American officials in Iraq," as "all six U.S. agencies involved in the re-
construction effort lost all or some of their senior staff [in 2005]."'~~ The Wash-
ington Times reported that "the government still lacks the personnel and exper-
tise to conduct proper oversight and management of military outsourcing in
Iraq," and cites "poor contractor performance" and retention of employees "with
insufficient qualifications or undesirable backgrounds," as well as a "lack of
government accounting" when it came to reconstruction funds and projects."0 In
a similar fashion, the Boston Globe reported the persistence of "contractor de-
lays" due to "higher security demands" and increased "efforts to quell the insur-
gency by improving living standards."'"
As available evidence demonstrates, the reconstruction of Iraq has generally
fallen below the expectations of most critics and supporters of the war. This, in
large part, has to do with the redirection of reconstruction funds toward pacifica-
tion of Iraqi resistance groups. Out of the only 18.4 billion dollars originally set
aside by the U.S. for reconstruction, half ended up redirected toward pacifica-
tion."' 18.4 billion dollar commitment was initially directed at reconstruction,
despite the estimates of the World Bank that to return Iraq to its 1991 level of
development (at a time when it was already devastated by eight years of war
with Iran) would cost fifty-five billion dollar^."^ The World Bank's fifty-five
billion dollar figure, however, is likely to be a major underestimate of recon-
struction needs, as Iraq was still suffering under deteriorating infrastructure in
mid-2006, when approximately forty-five billion dollars in aid had been allo-
cated.Il4 The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that "long-term reconstruc-
tion" of Iraq could cost one hundred billion dollars, if not much more.'15 In addi-
tion, the original amount set aside by the U.S. for reconstruction listed above is a
bit misleading, as a study by Ed Harriman revealed that Donald Rumsfeld and
Paul Bremer "made sure that the reconstruction of Iraq is paid for by the 'liber-
ated' country," rather than by the United States itself. This meant that, out of the
initial twenty billion dollars set aside from rebuilding, most was paid for by Iraq,
with the U.S. fronting only about 300 million dollars.'I6
Large amounts (potentially billions) may have been wasted on projects with
little prospect of success (but of great value to reconstruction companies), as is
suggested by critics involved in the reconstruction process."7 Corruption is con-
sidered a serious problem according to critical studies of the reconstruction ef-
fort. One estimate indicates that the U.S. embassy has had difficulty accounting
2.8 billion dollars in contracted commitments that were allocated in the first half
of 2005 a10ne."~ Audits published as of January 2006 revealed that at least 12
billion dollars in funds spent by the U.S. and the interim regime were not ade-
quately recorded or accounted for.l19
With reduced levels of funding, Iraq has made limited progress in rebuild-
ing.I2O By mid-2005, the U.S. General Accounting Office found that Iraqi power
levels were lower than they had been before the March 2003 invasion, with resi-
dents of Baghdad having access to electricity for no more than six hours a
day.I2' By May 2005, Iraq was producing only 2.1 million barrels of oil a day,
and exporting only 1.4 million, as contrasted with prewar levels of 2.6 million
barrels produced per day and 2.1 million barrels exported each day.'22 Iraq's