Page 246 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror
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236                         Chapter 9

               one in the war. Like most Arabs, it opposed Saddam's regime and opposed the
               invasion."87 Miles continues: "All the information the channel received, whether
               it came from Coalition Central Command or from the Iraqi Ministry of Informa-
               tion, was treated with equal skepticism. . . information coming from the Iraqi
               Minister of Information, Muhammad Said al-Sahaf, and information from coali-
               tion spokesmen, Brigadier General Vincent K. Brooks. . . was treated as equally
               unre~iable."~~
                                    Pro-War Propaganda:
                                  The Embedded Approach

               The embedded approach to reporting in Iraq has emerged as a disciplinary insti-
               tution against critical anti-war reporting. During the first Gulf War in 1991, the
               first Bush  administration attempted a much  cruder version  of  embedding, in
               which the U.S. military physically restricted the American press from entering
               combat areas by herding them into journalistic pools which were not allowed to
               view the conflict up close. This approach to limiting field reporting gave way to
               a more "open"  version of embedding in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as hundreds
               of reporters were allowed to travel with coalition forces.
                  To the approval of the Pentagon and the Bush administration, embedding
               became the preferred method of reporting for establishment journalists  in Iraq.
               Jim Wilkinson, Director of Strategic Communications at U.S. Central Command
               conveys  the  psyche  of  most  mainstream  American  reporters  well,  stating:
               "There are two types of reporters in the world today: Those who are embedded
               and those who wish they were embedded."89 Assessments of the embedded ap-
              proach  have  been  overwhelmingly positive  throughout the U.S.  mass  media.
              Eric Bums of Fox News  Watch argues that embedded journalists have been suc-
               cessful in "balancing the needs of the press, the military, and the public."90 Jane
              Hall of the American University agrees, arguing that embedding "showed jour-
              nalists can be trusted" by the military to report on the war in a way that con-
               forms to the government agenda.9' Rem Rieder, editor of the American Journal-
               ism Review celebrates: "it  is clear that the great embedding experiment was a
              home run as far as the news media and the American people are ~oncerned."~'
                  Embedded reporters'  protection by the American military has come with a
              price, as reporters agree to forego most serious challenges to the U.S. invasion
              and  occupation,  in  turn  normalizing the  U.S.  presence  in  post-Saddam Iraq.
              Chris Hedges, a veteran war reporter for the New York Times explains that em-
              bedded reporting translates into "look[ing] at Iraq totally through the eyes of the
              U.S. military."93 As reporters embedded in Iraq eat, sleep, and share meaningful
              experiences with American troops, they develop a close bond with the troops.
                  Embeds rely on U.S. and British military forces to provide them with secu-
              rity as well. Army Major General Buford Blount explains that, in this relation-
              ship, "a  level of trust develops between the soldier and the media  that offers
              nearly  unlimited  access"  to  the batt~efield.~~ However,  reporters  who  embed
              themselves also become  subject to  significant restrictions in their capacity to
              report stories in a way that is critical of the U.S. Reporters become subject to the
              potential discipline of U.S. or allied armed forces, as they are forced to sign con-
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