Page 78 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

68 Chapter 3

Miller's reporting on the issue of WMD, however, is far from an isolated
incident, as it is symbolic of a long-standing practice within the mainstream
media of respecting, rather than attacking official sources, especially during
times of war. Although Judith Miller is now considered on the "fringe" of
mainstream journalism, her reporting is not out of the ordinary--in fact it was
the standard in a press that collectively failed to scrutinize its sources regarding
Iraqi WMD.
Miller's over-reliance on high-level government sources is actually the
norm in covering foreign conflicts and other important issues. Recall that on
September 12, 2002, President Bush formally announced to the international
community the threat that Saddam Hussein posed to the world in front of the
United Nations General Assembly. At this point, the Bush administration had
already initiated a serious public campaign against Saddam Hussein and Iraq.
However, this speech, delivered in front of the world community, can certainly
be seen as the official beginning of the U.S.'s pursuit of an invasion of Iraq.
Over the next six months, the New York Times consistently and overwhelmingly
quoted and reiterated the White House's position on Iraq, while treating
opposing views with skepticism, or ignoring them altogether.
From September 12, 2002 to September 18, 2002-the first week of
reporting after Bush's speech to the U.N.-the issue of Saddam's supposed
possession of WMD was covered on the front page and the international pages
(section A) in twenty different articles. Within those articles, thirteen classified
Iraqi possession of WMD as either certain or probable. This assumption
obviously originated from the statements of Bush and Blair administration
officials, although often through statements made by the reporter of each piece
themselves. Take one example, as seen in a September 18, 2002 story by the
New York Times, which reported that President Bush stated: "Iraq must give
up.. .its weapons of mass destruction.. .or face the consequences.'*5 Another
example is seen in a September 18 piece reported that, "The Bush
Administration had little faith. . . [that] inspections. . . ensure Iraq's
di~armament."~ Within those twenty articles mentioned above, only 5 articles
contained statements that were both supportive of, and critical of the
administration's WMD charges.
Within one of the few balanced pieces that came out of this time period, the
New York Times did report that, "Scott Ritter. . . doubted Iraq was still hiding
chemical, biological, and nuclear or radiological weapons.'*' This, however,
was the only time from September up until late November when the paper
reported anything within the international news section on Scott Ritter's
statements and claims, although Ritter was previously considered one of the
foremost experts on Iraq's weapons capabilities. Most of the skepticism or
denunciations of official claims that Iraq possessed WMD came from Iraqi
officials. Just two of the twenty articles within this time frame reported only
skeptical or negative comments regarding Bush's claims originating from Iraqi
political figures, such as Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, and Naji
Sabri, Iraq's minister of foreign affairs.