Page 294 - Contribution To Phenomenology
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THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN       HUSSERL            287

              of  validation.  The  dilemma  is  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  most  radical
              need  of  life  today  is  strict  science  which  does  not  yield  to  the  urgency
              of  life's  pressures  and  takes  the  time  to  pursue  the  timeless  values  of
              science,  whereas  on  the  other  hand,  life's  pressures  are  such  that  we
              cannot  wait  on  theories  to  legitimate  our  position-takings.  While  a  good
              part  of  the  essay  is  a  sharp  criticism  of  world-view  philosophy  because
              it  confuses  theoretical  philosophy with  world-views  and  neglects  the  strict
              scientific  side  of  philosophy,  Husserl  must  acknowledge  the  practical
              importance  of  world-view  presentations.  Further,  as  Boehm  pointed  out,
              philosophy  as  a  strict  science  and,  indeed,  its  fuller  version  of  transcen-
              dental  phenomenology  are  preceded  by  the  awakening  of  ideas  through
             world-views  and  ideals  of  such  a  philosophy;  without  these  going  in
              advance  not  even  transcendental  phenomenology  would  be  possible.^^
                If  this  is  true  one  might  well  wonder whether  Husserl  is  not  forced  to
              reappraise  tradition  and  to  recognize  the  value  of  a  **wise"  tradition  or
             one  which embodies a  ^'world-view" which points  in  the  direction of logos,
             justice,  and  peace  and  fends  off  the  deluge  of  violence  and  irrationality.
             He  seemed  to  think  this  was  the  merit  of  the  world-view  of  German
             Idealism.  Of  interest  is  that  many  aborigine  societies,  although without a
             passion  for logos, have  communitarian  traditions which  would  seem  to  be
             much  wiser  than  ours.  In  any  case,  the  ideal  of  a  "philosophic  culture"
             is  the  ideal  of  a  certain  kind  of  disposition,  therefore  an  ideal  of  a
             potentiahty  for  authenticity.  As  such  it  is  not  active.  Are  active  positive
             beUefs  and  practices  which  promote  the  ideals  of  reason,  justice,
             community,  and  non-violence  not  needed?  Husserl  himself,  at  the  end  of
             his  life,  was  forced  to  acknowledge  that  "the  dream  was  over"  for  most
             of  his  culture  regarding  philosophy.  Indeed,  even  in  the  early  1920's,  i.e.,
             prior  to  the  madness  of  the  Third  Reich,  he  saw  Europe  at  the  mercy
             of  Realpolitiker,  capitalists,  technocrats,  and  cynical  academics  for  whom
              the  abandonment  of  reason  was  the  most  obvious  course  (see,  e.g.,  Hua
             XXVII,  117-118).
                The  belief  in  ideals,  the  adopting  of  a  grand  metaphor  or  world-view,
             belief  in a  religious  revelation, etc.,  are  all  irrational  at  least  in  the  sense


                  ^^  Rudolf  Boehm,  "Husserl  und  der  Klassische  Idealismus," Vom Gesichtspunkt
             der  Phaenomenohgie:  Husserl-Studien (the  Hague:  Nljhoff,  1968),  18  ff.  In  a  later
              text  (A  V  21,  76a)  Husserl  is  more  explicit.  People  have  to  survive  and  act  and
             cannot  postpone  decisions  in  the  face  of  unresolved  scientific  queries.  It  is  typical
             of  everyday  practical  life  that  the  individual  must  act  in  a  context  of  what  is
             scientifically  unknown  and  unpredictable.
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