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44                    RICHARD    M  ZANER

              treated  at  all.  In our  times—through  informed  consent, patient  rights, and
              the  like—this  difference  has  received  moral  and  legal  support.  Still,  the
              asymmetry  of  the  relationship  does  not  automatically  imply  that  it  is  the
              physician  who  should  make  decisions.  It  has  thus  become  imperative  for
              physicians  to  develop  an  understanding  of  the  relation  with  patients  that
              is  quite  different  from  that  expressed  in  the  more  traditional  "medical
              model"  ([4];  [16];  [20];  [23];  [32]).  In  order  to  develop  coherent,  accep-
              table,  and  practical  therapeutic  plans,  and  to  enable  sound  decisions,
              physicians  must  learn  the  patient's  (and  family's,  at  times  even  the
              significant  others')  experiences,  interpretations,  meanings,  and  values.
                (ii)  At  the  very  least,  this  suggests  that  the  patient's  place  is  not,  and
              in  many  ways  has  never  been,  simple  passivity—despite  the  typical  usage
              of  "patient."  The  ability  to  alter  a  patient's  condition  and  life  thus  does
              not  thereby  signify  having power-over—and  that  is  morally  significant.  In
              clinical  encounters, power-to  has  most  often  been  understood as  a  sort  of
              benign  power-for  (parentalism)  or  at  times  power-over or on-behalf-of
              (paternalism).  Increasingly,  however,  the  physician  has  had  to  understand
              the  power-to-alter  as  power-with:  decision-making  requires  the  active
              participation  of  the  patient  (often,  the  family  and  others  in  the  patient's
              circle  of  intimates)—indeed, decisions  are  the  responsibility of  patients  or
              their  legal  surrogates  (within  certain  limits).^  This,  I  think,  is  surely  one
              reason  underlying  the  idea  that  medicine  is  an  inherently  moral  enter-
              prise:  to  act  on  behalf of  the  patient,  or,  if  nothing else  to do  no harm
              (i.e.  "beneficence"),  requires  acting  with the  patient  (which  suggests  that
              the  traditional  sense  of  beneficence  needs  to  be  rethought).  The
              physician's  place  in  the  relationship  is  a  form  of  caring and  is  strictly
              correlated  with  patient trusts
                (iii)  Another  aspect  of  this  was  strikingly  evident  already  in  ancient
              medicine,  especially  in  the  Hippocratic  Oath  ([5], pp.  6-10;  [43], pp. 202-
              223).  Reflection  on  this  covenant,  along  with  the  recognition  of  the
              asymmetry  in  the  ability  to  bring  about  changes  in  the  patient,  makes  it
              evident  that  the  relationship  itself  makes  it  possible  (even  seductively




                  ^  It  has  become  more  common  to  acknowledge  that  the  physician  must
              recognize  that  the  patient  (family,  legal  surrogate)  is  "the  true  source  of  authority,"
              not  the  physician  (who  acts  solefy  as  "advisor" or  "consultant"  to  the  patient)  ([27],
              p.  199).
                  ^  Even  if,  so  far  as  doctor  and  patient  are  strangers,  the  best  that  may  be
              hoped  for  are  situations  where  only  "temporary  trust"  is  possible  ([18],  p.  52).
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