Page 20 - Privacy in a Cyber Age Policy and Practice
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A CYBER AGE PRIVACY DOCTRINE  5

           public policy. Such normative changes have occurred in other areas. For
           instance, the civil rights movement led to changes in the position of the
           Supreme Court (e.g., from Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Educa-
           tion) and to acts of Congress (e.g., the Voting Rights Act of 1965). More
           recently, changes were introduced both by the courts and by various legis-
           latures reflecting changes in the characterization of same sex marriage in
           the moral culture. Now such a change is called for in regard to the concept
           of privacy. This chapter next discusses the normative principles of such a
           reconstituted concept. (For a philosophical discussion of these normative
           principles, see Chapter 7.)
             (i) In seeking to base a privacy doctrine not on the usual foundations
           of expectations or location, this chapter draws on a liberal communitar-
           ian philosophy that assumes that individual rights, such as the right to
           privacy, must be balanced with concerns for the common good, such as
           those about public health and national security. By contrast, authoritarian
           and East Asian communitarians tend to be exclusively concerned with the
           common good or pay mind to rights only to the extent that they serve the
           rulers’ aims. And at the opposite end of the spectrum, libertarians and sev-
           eral contemporary liberals privilege individual rights and autonomy over
           societal formulations of the common good. (Although the term “common
           good” is not one often found in legal literature, its referent is rather close to
           what is meant by “public interest,” which courts frequently recognize, and
           a similar concept is found in the U.S. Constitution’s reference to the quest
           for a “more perfect union.”)
             The Fourth Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in
           their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
           and seizures, shall not be violated” (emphasis added). This is a prime exam-
           ple of a liberal communitarian text because it does not employ the absolute,
           rights-focused language of many amendments (e.g., “Congress shall make
           no law”), but recognizes on the face of it that there are reasonable searches,
           which are understood to be those in which a compelling public interest
           takes precedence over personal privacy.
             (ii) This book assumes that the communitarian balance is meta-stable.
           That is, for societies to maintain a sound communitarian regime—a careful
           balance between individual rights and the common good—societies must
           constantly adjust their public policies and laws in response to changing
           external circumstances (e.g., 9/11) and internal developments (e.g., FBI
           overreach). Moreover, given that societal steering mechanisms are rather
           loose, societies tend to oversteer and must correct their corrections with
           still further adjustments. For example, in the mid-1970s, the Church and
           Pike Committees uncovered “domestic spying on Americans, harassment
           and disruption of targeted individuals and groups, assassination plots
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