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145. Ibid.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid.
148. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” The United Nations, http://
www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
149. Richard B. Lillich, as quoted in David Cole, “Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to
the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?” Georgetown Law Faculty Publi-
cations and Other Works 297 (2003): 372, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.
edu/facpub/297.
150. William A. Schabas, “Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?” Brooklyn Journal
of International Law 21 (1995): 277, 280, as quoted in Kristina Ash, “U.S.
Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Credibility Maximization and Global Influence,” Northwestern Journal of
International Human Rights (2005), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwest-
ern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=njihr.
151. For more on this “tu quoque” argument, see Jack Goldsmith, “Spying on
Allies,” Lawfare, July 1, 2013, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/07/spying-
on-allies/. Goldsmith notes that there is even some reason for thinking that
widespread spying provides a normative and legal defense of privacy viola-
tions, quoting a 1999 Department of Defense Report wherein it was contended
that “the lack of strong international legal sanctions for peacetime espionage
may also constitute an implicit application of the international law doctrine
called ‘tu quoque’ (roughly, a nation has no standing to complain about a
practice in which it itself engages).” This claim would also defuse more spe-
cific criticisms that PRISM is spying even on our allies. See, for example, Ste-
ven Erlanger, “Outrage in Europe Grows Over Spying Disclosures,” The New
York Times, July 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/europe/
france-and-germany-piqued-over-spying-scandal.html?pagewanted=all.
152. John Napier Tye, “Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan Rule That Lets
the NSA Spy on Americans,” Washington Post, July 18, 2014.
153. In an editorial response, the “civil liberties protection officer for the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence” defended the order, noting that
“Oversight is extensive and multi-layered,” but this oversight appears to be
essentially internal to the Executive branch. See Alexander W. Joel, The Truth
About Executive Order 12333, Politico, August 18, 2014.
154. One issue with Executive Order 12333 is the lack of oversight. Sen. Dianne
Feinstein (D-CA), the Senate Intelligence Committee chair, said in August
2013 that the committee is less well-informed on “intelligence gathering that
relies solely on presidential authority,” and “said she planned to ask for more
briefings on those programs.” A “senior committee staff member” likewise
noted that “the committee is far less aware of operations conducted under
12333,” as the committee cannot ask questions about programs of which it is
unaware, and the NSA is not obliged to volunteer such information. See Bar-
ton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, “NSA Collects Millions of e-mail Address
Books Globally,” Washington Post, October 14, 2013.