Page 36 - Privacy in a Cyber Age Policy and Practice
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MORE COHERENT, LESS SUBJECTIVE, AND OPERATIONAL  21

           specific procedures, grants an agent a license to do so. In other cases, col-
           lection of some information should be allowed, but the ability of the gov-
           ernment to carry out secondary usages should be limited or banned. To
           express this notion in terms of the expectation of privacy, an individual
           suspected of a crime should expect to be questioned by the police but
           should also be able to expect that their answers will be locked away if they
           are found innocent.
             Several overarching legal doctrines do address the issues raised by sec-
           ondary usages and cybernation. This chapter addresses two of these. First,
           the third-party doctrine holds that once a person has knowingly relayed
           information to a third party, sharing this information with law enforcement
           officials by the intermediate party does not constitute a Fourth Amend-
           ment search and therefore requires no warrant. The Supreme Court ruled
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           in United States v. Miller  and Smith v. Maryland  that business records
           such as financial documents and records of phone numbers dialed are not
           protected from warrantless collection by law enforcement agencies under
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           certain circumstances.  The Court also held that law enforcement’s col-
           lection of the content of conversations between suspects and third-party
           informants is not presumptively unconstitutional, because those third par-
           ties could pass along the information to the police even without technolog-
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           ical assistance.  Richard A. Epstein summarizes the third-party doctrine
           as follows: “The received judicial wisdom is that any person who chooses
           to reveal information to a third person necessarily forfeits whatever protec-
           tion the Fourth Amendment provides him.” 18
             The third-party doctrine is particularly problematic in an age of cyber-
           nation, because third parties can share information with others and com-
           bine it with still more information, resulting in detailed and intimate
           dossiers of innocent people unsuspected of crimes. Given that more and
           more information about people is in the hands of third parties due to the
           extensive number and scope of transactions and communications car-
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           ried out in cyberspace and stored in the cloud,  if the third-party doc-
           trine is allowed to stand, precious little will prevent the government from
           intruding on the privacy of American citizens. Individuals constantly leave
           behind them a trail of data with every click of a mouse; “data exhaust”
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           akin to the vapors left behind a car.  Will Thomas DeVries points out that
           one of the key characteristics of the “digital revolution” for privacy is that
           “every interaction with the Internet, every credit card transaction, every
           bank withdrawal, every magazine subscription is recorded digitally and
           linked to specific individuals. [… The] impact of the digital age is so deep
           and pervasive that expansion of a single area of privacy law is unlikely to
           adequately address the problems. Since the digital age affects every aspect
           of privacy, it requires an evolution not just in the existing framework, but
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