Page 44 - Privacy in a Cyber Age Policy and Practice
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MORE COHERENT, LESS SUBJECTIVE, AND OPERATIONAL  29

           volume, so is the number of collection methods a crude but useable mea-
           sure of bandwidth. This is the case because some surveillance methods are
           able to gather many more types of information about an individual than
           others; for instance, taping phone conversations (which captures the com-
           plete content of a call and thereby potentially includes many kinds of infor-
           mation) is a much broader bandwidth method than the collection of phone
           records (which captures who called whom, at what time, and from where).
           For traffic control purposes, it is possible to measure the speed at which a
           vehicle travels in public places without taking a picture of the person sit-
           ting next to the driver in the front seat. (Incidentally, for this reason, speed
           cameras are set lower, at the level of license plates.) A more sophisticated
           measure of bandwidth could take these differences into account.

           ii. Sensitivity
           The concept that some kinds of information are more sensitive than others
           has been often articulated by privacy scholars and operationalized by law-
           makers, albeit using a variety of terms. Additional terms that have been
           applied include “intimate information” or “revealing information,” and
           some scholars have defined them in terms of the level of risk or the extent
           of harm to one’s privacy. 45
             Two levels of distinction between types of information must take place
           in order to enable the development of a nuanced understanding of sensi-
           tive information. The first level of distinction is very basic; it establishes the
           realm of information to be considered, distinguishing personal informa-
           tion from other forms of information that either do not deal with persons
           or have been de-identified or anonymized in ways that are presumed to be
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           irreversible.  (Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove note that “numerous
           federal statutes turn on [the distinction between personally-identifiable
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           information (PII) and other forms of information].” ) Briefly, all nonper-
           sonal information is inherently not sensitive. Revealing the amount of rain
           that falls in Spain, for example, endangers no one’s privacy. The issue of
           sensitivity concerns the second level of distinction, which distinguishes
           among the various kinds of personal information.
             Quite a few leading privacy advocates rail against all collection of per-
           sonal information by the government. In response to the introduction of
           airport screening gates to prevent skyjackings, an American Civil Liber-
           ties Union (ACLU) staff counsel wrote that “the new [general] passenger
           screening regulations are completely inconsistent with the values safe-
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           guarded by the fourth amendment.”  The ACLU has also opposed speed
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           cameras at traffic intersections, calling them “extreme,”  as well as the use
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           of cookies on federal government websites —without which many Inter-
           net activities might well be impossible. (In fact, the ACLU website itself
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