Page 118 - Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere

life—unruly children, cruel husbands, lack of self-esteem—and both move-
ments have in common a focus on changing one’s life by changing one’s atti-
tudes or outlook, through return to Christ or trust in God. Occasionally a New
Age tinge is added, as when people are called upon to “listen” to one another, to
stay calm, to ¤nd an inner peace, but for the most part the solution offered is,
in one case, a return to strict observance and, in the other, “accepting Jesus.”
In both instances we observe much attention to fund-raising from the public,
fronted by mediatic entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs/preachers who com-
bine proselytizing, managerial, and communications skills have become a stan-
dard feature of religious campaigning worldwide. The example of the Brazilian—
but now international—Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Birman and
Lehmann 1999; Campos 1997; Freston 2001), which has developed a vast cen-
tralized bureaucratic and commercial apparatus out of this combination, is ex-
ceptional but emblematic: for the most part such ventures are one-man shows
that operate in conjunction with other religious organizations on the ground,
as Amnon Yitzchak does.
There is a straightforward explanation for the preference for radio over tele-
17
vision, and for local stations over national networks. Radio is cheaper and al-
lows the broadcaster to target a niche audience. Local stations have technical
and commercial advantages: their phone-in programs have low start-up costs,
they probably avoid liability for copyright fees, operate with volunteers, and do
not need to sustain uninterrupted programming—their audience quickly be-
comes accustomed to tuning in, so long as broadcasts keep to a regular time-
table.
In Latin America, Pentecostalism has evolved a subtle and complex relation-
ship with popular culture, and with the complex of relationships that bind the
popular to the erudite in both religious and secular spheres (Lehmann 1996).
Pentecostals attack the culture of Catholicism and its intertwined institutional
and popular expressions, yet manage to do so while apparently deepening their
penetration of popular culture. The institutional Catholic Church is depicted
as luxurious and self-satis¤ed, cosseted in its ¤nery and arrogant in its elaborate
architecture. As in Israel, the intertwined secular cultures of the elite and the
people are also targeted, using the media to present a counterculture against the
rational secularism of the intellectual elite, and against the political elite (Bir-
man and Lehmann 1999).
Popular culture exists in interdependence with the culture of the erudite and
the elite—it is not a relationship of dependence, nor is the popular a mere arti-
fact of elite manipulation. Rather, in these contexts the cultural struggle is not
only for the control of popular culture but also for the power to state with au-
thority what that culture consists of.
The paradox is that, despite their often dramatic rejection of the culture of
the popular sectors, Pentecostals also successfully portray themselves as closer to
the language and daily concerns of those same popular sectors. This is achieved
by a refashioning of the imaginary of popular culture and by operating trans-

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